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Abstract 
The French Mississippi Bubble, British South Sea Bubble and Dutch Windhandel were 
part of a 1719-20 pan-European equity boom that involved many more countries than 
hitherto thought. Drawing on extensive archival research, the paper establishes that 
speculation and stock euphoria spanned from Portugal to Russia, and from Sicily to 
Sweden. As such, it demonstrates that 1720 European financial markets were largely driven 
by common forces. Comparing all the projects (successful or unsuccessful) for joint-stock 
companies promoted around 1720, the paper underlines three aspects that shed new light 
on this first transnational financial bubble. First, these projects bring to the fore a two-speed 
Europe: while the most advanced economies focused on innovative business sectors (in 
particular marine insurance), the least developed were catching up with a model that was 
more than one century old, namely the privileged company for long-distance trade and 
colonization. Second, French and British experiments with public debt engineering (that 
fuelled the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles) were emulated throughout Europe; in almost 
every country there were schemes geared to improving public finances. Third, the timing of 
the global equity boom was more diachronic than previously thought, suggesting that 
contemporaries did not expect that a stock market crash somewhere should necessarily 
generate a contagion effect. 
 
 
Keywords: Financial history, early modern history, European economic integration, South Sea 
Bubble, Mississippi Bubble, financial crisis synchronicity, joint-stock companies, public debt-for-
equity swap, marine insurance, long-distance trade, financial innovation. (JEL F31, F36, G01, G15, 
H63, M13, N23, N43) 
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A Pan-European joint-stock boom 
Problem, hypothesis, method, and definitions 
Few financial crises are, historically speaking, as fascinating and meaningful as the 
Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles of 1719-1720. On the one hand, they both represent an 
economic and political watershed event in the national histories of France and Britain. On 
the other hand, they were the two main sparks of the first international stock market boom 
in history. The two bubbles were connected and they reached their peak one shortly after 
the other, briefly followed by a third bubble, the so-called Dutch Windhandel (wind trade). 
This paper will focus on this transnational dimension, investigating a number of questions 
that had not been raised so far. 
For a century and a half, the transnational history of the 1720 equity boom has been a 
work-in-progress. Émile Levasseur (1854, p. 400-403) was probably the first scholar to 
frame a general, albeit rough, view about the subject. According to him, England and the 
United Provinces had ‘crudely imitated’ the methods that John Law (the Scottish financier, 
founder of the Mississippi Company) had introduced in France, and thus the English and 
Dutch stock market bubbles were wilder and more short-lived than the French one. 
William R. Scott (1912, I, p. 398-408) explicitly contested this interpretation. Comparing 
the bubbles in Paris and London, he concluded that they followed parallel yet different 
courses; he also described contemporary undertakings in Scotland and Ireland (I, p. 433; 
III, p. 269-272). Gerrit Van Rijn (1899) initiated the study of the Dutch Windhandel, while 
Caesar Amsinck (1894) established that Hamburg had also experienced an equity boom in 
1720. André-Émile Sayous (1937 and 1940) described the role of Geneva and Dutch 
investors in the Paris and London stock exchanges, inaugurating a rich current of research 
on international speculation during the 1720 bubble. John Carswell (1960) and Peter G. M. 
Dickson (1967) underlined that the French, English, Dutch, and Hamburger stock market 
booms had been connected. Finally, Larry Neal (1990, p. 62-79) demonstrated the existence 
of these connections through the analysis of exchange rates. 
These are, quickly outlined, the main milestones of this transnational history of the 1720 
financial euphoria, although many other outstanding works have contributed to its 
construction.1 Yet, an important question has not been fully explored so far: the bubble’s 
                                                
1 Among the works that provide new perspectives on this transnational history, see in particular Groeneveld, 
De economische crisis, 1940; Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce, 1941; Ashton, Economic fluctuations, 1959; Lüthy, La 
banque protestante, 1959; Kindleberger, Manias, panics and crashes, 1978; Murphy, Richard Cantillon, 1986; Schubert, 
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international dimension itself.2 How widespread was the stock euphoria? How did different 
countries experience the bubble? This is what this paper will investigate. 
My starting hypothesis was that the energy of the equity boom having been so great in 
England, France, the Dutch Republic, and Hamburg, it was difficult to believe that no 
‘sparks’ would have reached elsewhere. In other words, the hypothesis is that the contagious 
exuberance characteristic of speculative bubbles had crossed the borders and spread 
throughout the continent to a far greater extent than previously documented.3  
Europe was, in many ways, already highly integrated in the early 18th century: people, 
ideas, goods, capital, and especially information circulated at a rather fast pace, in 
particular between the main ports and cities. News from Amsterdam (the hub of the 
European network of information of the time) usually reached Brussels in four days, 
London in six days, Copenhagen and Paris in one week, Bern in nine days, Vienna in two 
weeks, Naples, Madrid and Lisbon in about three weeks, St. Petersburg in slightly less than 
a month (even in winter).4 Throughout Europe newspapers kept their readers abreast of the 
latest foreign military, political, economic, and financial developments. The Gaceta de 
Madrid, for instance, regularly gave news (and sometimes share prices) about the Paris, 
London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg stock markets.5 From Naples to London, from Lisbon 
to Leipzig and Vienna most periodicals did the same.6 Information traveled also ceaselessly 
via the crisscrossing letters of merchants,7 international investors, diplomats, spies,8 etc. 
Under these circumstances, was it possible that the astonishing financial experiments and 
stock market booms going on in Paris, London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg had not 
                                                                                                                                               
The Ties That Bound, 1986; Neal, I am not master of events, 2012; Frehen, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst, ‘New 
evidence on the first financial bubble’, 2013; Id., ‘Finance in the Great Mirror of Folly’, 2013. 
2 I will use in this paper the term ‘bubble’ in a broad sense, to denote a massive episode of stock fever, and 
without reference to the rational or irrational bubbles’ debate. 
3 About bubbles and psychological contagion see in particular Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, 2012, p. 
179-183. 
4 I calculate these traveling times according to the dates indicated in the contemporary newspapers.  
5 E.g. the issues of 8 August, 12 and 26 September, 28 November 1719, 13 January, 23 April, 13 August, 10 
September 1720. 
6 There were few exception such as the Diario di Roma that ignored almost entirely stock-market news. 
7 On mercantile networks see in particular Neal and Quinn, ‘Networks of information’, 2001; Casado 
Alonso, ‘La circulation de l’information’, 2008; Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers, 2009; Bartolomei, ‘Les 
réseaux négociants’, 2012; Fusaro, ‘Cooperating Mercantile Networks’, 2012. 
8 The king of Spain, the king of Piedmont, or the tsar, for example, were regularly informed about the latest 
financial and stock market developments in France, Britain, and the United Provinces by their diplomats and 
secret agents. For Russia: Troickij, ‘Le système de John Law’, 1970, p. 47. For Piedmont see for instance AST, 
Lettere dei ministri, Francia, mazzo 147. For Spain see for example AGS, Estado leg. 4331, Francia.  
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inspired, in one way or another, businessmen, financiers, and rulers in the rest of Europe? 
Some remarks by Peter Dickson and John Carswell support furthermore my starting 
hypothesis. Dickson mentions that the Spanish court rejected various financial projects in 
August 1720.9 Carswell writes that John Lambert, a director of the South Sea Company, 
declined that same year an invitation from the Portuguese crown to come to Lisbon to 
advise on a projected Brazil Company.10 The latter anecdote is noteworthy because it can 
be connected to Eric Schubert’s finding about a sharp spike in the Lisbon-on-London 
exchange rate (August 1720), indicating strong capital inflows in Portugal.11 Although they 
were aborted, the Spanish projects are also worthy of interest. This is where my paper 
distinguishes itself methodologically from other researches in the field: I argue that, for a 
connected history of the 1720 bubble, actors’ intentions are not necessarily less significant 
than their achievements; foundered ventures are not less interesting than those that gave 
rise to a stock market boom. We will see below as to why. This leads me to precisely define 
the focus of this paper: a review of all the schemes (successful and unsuccessful) for new 
joint-stock companies promoted around 1720. 
That year witnessed a profusion of ambitious undertakings. In Poland, the crown revived 
a seventeenth century plan to dig a canal between the Oder and the Vistula in order to 
open new outlets for grains exports.12 In Russia, according to contemporary reports, 
600,000 men were at work to create a ‘navigable stream’ between the Volga and the 
Baltic.13 In London, a certain Mr. Gordon had informed the directors of the East India 
Company that he had located Ophir (the mythical land of king Solomon’s gold mines) on 
the east coast of Africa. The directors took the lead seriously enough to mount a large 
expedition there, and to petition the government for some men-of-war as an escort against 
the pirates of Madagascar.14 We could mention several other grand 1720 projects, and also 
more prosaic ones, such as the creation of a stock exchange in Geneva,15 a notes-for-bonds 
                                                
9 Dickson, Financial Revolution, cit., p. 153. 
10 Carswell, South Sea, cit., p. 119. The Brazil scheme is also mentioned by Dickson, Financial Revolution, cit., 
p. 153. 
11 Schubert, The Ties That Bound, cit., p. 155. 
12 Gazette d’Amsterdam, 13 September 1720. 
13 AAE, CP, Hambourg 48, c. 281 sq.; Weekly Packet, 5 March 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 19 and 26 
November 1720.  
14 BL, IOR B/56, c. 20, 40, 56; British Gazetteer, 16 July 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 12, 19, 23 July and 27 
September 1720; Gazette de Leyde, 30 August 1720; Daily Post, 23 July 1720 (quoted by Carswell, South Sea, cit., 
p. 172).  
15 Archives d’État de Genève, Chambre de Commerce, Registre III, p. 268.  
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swap in Denmark,16 a state loan in Venice,17 as well as undertakings for manufactures,18 
free ports,19 and lotteries20 across the continent. 
All these schemes contributed to a general euphoria, and some were clearly connected to 
the pan-European stock mania. However, none of them involved the formation of a new 
joint-stock concern, so they all fall outside the scope of this investigation. The same is true 
for several enterprises initiated in 1720, some with quite large capital, but with no effective 
secondary market for shares. A good example is the Compagnie of the duke de La Force. 
Marcel Giraud writes that, among the many business set up in France in 1719-20 to 
colonize the Mississippi, this was the only one ‘based on emissions of shares’.21 The 
Compagnie had a capital of 1.2 million livres divided in 60 shares. However, there is no 
evidence that these shares could be traded freely or easily. The firm – centered de facto on 
individuals as much as capital – was a sort of hybrid partnership rather than a proper joint-
stock company. 
To sum up, the survey will only focus on schemes for new companies that had – or 
should have had according to the plans of their promoters – an effective and open 
secondary market for shares. (I am not considering here limited liability, because in the 
eighteenth century this feature did not necessarily go hand in hand with the joint-stock 
form.)22 
 
A Pan-European joint-stock boom 
At this preliminary stage of the investigation, it is useful to divide Europe in two groups: a) 
the countries that previous researches on the 1720 financial boom have identified and 
studied (i.e. Britain,23 France,24 the Dutch Republic,25 Hamburg,26 and Ireland)27; b) the 
                                                
16 Gazette d’Amsterdam, 12 March and 23 April 1720. 
17 Dickson, Financial Revolution, cit., p. 138. 
18 For instance, glasses manufactures in Austria: Gazette d’Amsterdam, 12 March and 23 April 1720. 
19 In particular in Trieste, Fiume, Pozzuoli, La Spezia, Messina, Santos, and London: Di Vittorio, ‘Porti e 
porto franco’, 1972; AAE, CP Gênes 73, c. 426 sq.; ASV, V Savi, decreti Ia 38, 7 September 1720. Avvisi di 
Napoli, 14 May 1720; Gazzetta di Bologna, 7 May 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 30 August 1720. 
20 E.g. Corriere di Vienna, 20 April, 2 October 1720; Daily Courant, 12 July 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 26 April, 
28 and 31 May 1720; Gazeta de Lisboa, 10 October 1720. 
21 Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane française, 1966, III, p. 207. 
22 See Handlin and Handlin, ‘Origins of the American Business Corporation’, 1945; DuBois, The English 
business company after the Bubble act, 1971, pp. 93-93; Perrott, ‘Changes in Attitude to Limited Liability’, 1982. 
23 Among a long list of publications: in particular, Scott, Constitution, cit.; Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, cit.; 
Dickson, The Financial Revolution, cit.; Harris, ‘The Bubble Act’, 1994; Banner, Anglo American securities, 1998; 
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rest of the map, that is either entirely empty, or (in the case of Spain and Portugal: see supra) 
that contains only vague information. I will call the first group the ‘core countries’ of the 
equity boom and the second group the ‘periphery’. 
To identify the joint-stock schemes promoted in the periphery, I have drawn on 
extensive archival material, including correspondence, newspapers, pamphlets, diplomatic 
letters, and other official sources. For example, I have found in the Turin state archives 
various projects for banks and trading companies in Piedmont.28 In the Archivo General de 
Simancas, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, British Library, Coutts Archives, and National 
Archives, there are many documents related to the Portuguese ‘bubbles’ (contemporaries 
often used this term to describe speculative ventures).29 British, Dutch, Portuguese, and 
Austrian journals discuss about a Lorraine trading company and about two enterprises 
promoted in Denmark (the first for a Guinea, West India, and East India company; the 
second for an insurance firm).30 
Archival sources sometimes confirm newspapers’ reports, or vice versa. This is the case, 
for instance, with a Venetian project for a manufacturing concern,31 or a banking scheme in 
Brunswick.32 However, there is no reason to consider a priori that information taken only 
from the press is unreliable, especially when the facts are mentioned several times by the 
same newspaper or, even better, by different newspapers apparently using different 
                                                                                                                                               
Hoppit, ‘The Myths’, 2001; Temin and Voth, ‘Riding the South Sea Bubble’, 2004; Carlos and Neal, ‘The 
micro-foundations’, 2006; Paul, The South Sea Bubble, 2011; Wennerlind, Casualties of credit, 2011; Kleer, ‘Riding 
a wave’, 2015. 
24 In particular, Levasseur, Recherches historiques, cit.; Hamilton, ‘Prices and Wages at Paris’, 1936; Lüthy, La 
banque, cit.; Faure, La banqueroute, 1977; Murphy, John Law, 1977; Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal, Des 
marchés sans prix, 2001; Velde, ‘Government Equity and Money’, 2004; Id., ‘Was John Law’s System a bubble’, 
2009; White, ‘The Long Shadow of John Law’, 2013. 
25 Van Rijn, De Actiehandel in 1720, 1899; Slechte, ‘Het aandeel’, 1972; Id., Een noodlottig, 1982; De Jong, 
Jonker & Röell, ‘Dutch Corporate Finance’, 2013; Gelderblom & Jonker, ‘Mirroring different follies’, 2013.  
26 Amsinck, ‘Die ersten hamburgischen’, cit. 
27 Scott, Constitution, cit., I, p. 433; Hall, The Bank of Ireland, 1949; Ryder, ‘The Bank of Ireland’, 1982; Walsh, 
The South Sea Bubble and Ireland, 2014. 
28 AST, Finanza, I a., lotteria, tontina, banco di deposito, m. 7; Consiglio di Stato, verbali CF 1721-22. 
29 ASVA, Segreteria di Stato, Portogallo 75, c. 426 and 431; AGS, Estado leg. 7107, Portugal, 20 August, 3 
September, 17 September 1720; BL, Add ms. 31140, 3 September 1720; CA, Coutts Letter Book O 14, p. 
329; NA, SP 89/28, c. 25, 101, 124, 130, 137; SP 89/29, c. 12. 
30 See Appendix I. 
31 ASV, V Savi, scritture dep. com. 213, c. 27-32, 146 sq., 196; AST, Finanza, I a., lotteria, etc., m. 1. 
Applebee Journal, 10 September 1720; Daily Courant, 15 September 1720; Daily Post, 8 October 1720; Gazzetta di 
Bologna, 3 September 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 13 September 1720. 
32 See Appendix I.  
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sources.33 Consequently, as a rule, I have not included in the inventory undertakings that 
were only mentioned by one single paper in one single issue. There have three such cases so 
far: a marine insurance company in Venice, a firm for trade and insurance in Portugal, and 
debt-for equity schemes in Austria.34 By contrast, nine different journals report news about 
Spanish projects,35 five talk about a China joint-stock company set up in Russia,36 and two 
mention an undertaking for a trading firm in Mannheim (Palatinate).37 
I have also found much information in the secondary literature. Troickij (1970) has 
translated into French a Russian plan for a trading company. Huisman (1902) describes 
several projects promoted in the Austrian Netherlands; he also writes about the Imperial 
Oriental Company set up in Vienna.38 Sayous (1937) mentions a scheme in Geneva. Caizzi 
(1968) talks about a project in Milan; Di Vittorio (1968) about three ventures in Naples; 
Giarrizzo (1989) about two undertakings in Sicily. Finally, Groeneveld (1940) and 
Gelderblom & Jonker (2010) mention that a company was promoted in Emden (East Frisia), 
close to the Dutch border.  
Some of these authors (Gelderblom and Jonker, Groeneveld, Huisman, Sayous) connect 
their findings to the contemporary European stock mania; the others do not. Anyhow, to 
my knowledge, none of these Russian, Belgian, Geneva, Hanoverian, Milanese, Neapolitan, 
Sicilian, and East Frisian schemes appear in any other study on the 1720 financial boom. 
The only exception is the Viennese Oriental Company mentioned by Peter Dickson.39  
In several cases, I could complement information taken from the secondary literature 
with further evidence found in the archives. For instance, Austrian, Dutch, and French 
archives hold documents related to the Belgian schemes;40 contemporary newspapers report 
                                                
33 We can infer this in particular when the newspapers give different details about the same event. About the 
accuracy of contemporary newspapers on economic issues, see in particular, Morineaux, Ces Incroyables 
Gazettes, 1985; Neal, Rise, cit., p. 37. For a general perspective on the early modern press: Harris, London 
newspapers, 1987; Lüsebrink et al. (eds), Presse et événement, 2000; Association des historiens modernistes, 
L’information à l’époque moderne, 2001; Infelise, Prima dei giornali, 2002; Slauter, ‘Forward-Looking Statements’, 
2009. 
34 See Appendix II. 
35 See Appendix I. 
36 Daily Courant, 22 February 1722; Daily Journal, 27 February 1722; Daily Post, 23 and 27 February 1722; 
Evening Post, 27 February 1722; Lettres historiques, March 1722, p. 309. 
37 See Appendix I. 
38 Ibid., p. 157. On the beginnings of this company also: Roider, ‘Reform and Diplomacy’, 1994, p. 318-319; 
Ingrao, The Habsburg monarchy, 2000, p. 140. 
39 Dickson, Financial Revolution, cit. p. 138. 
40 See appendix I. 
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about the same schemes, 41 and also about the Emden Company and the Harburgh 
undertakings.42 On the other hand, as a second rule, I have not included in the inventory 
ventures mentioned by an author who did not provide specific sources. There is only one 
such instance: a plan for an insurance company in Sweden mentioned by C. Amsinck.43 I 
enquired in the Swedish archives, but did not find any evidence about this project. 
However, I hope that further research may confirm its existence. 
William R. Scott suggests that we will probably never know the exact number of new 
stocks promoted in England in 1720. The same is certainly true for Europe at large. Part of 
the documentation has been lost forever,44 and what is left is so vast that it would take a 
polyglot team of researchers years of labor to look thoroughly among the many archives 
across the continent. Yet, this paper is not a work of erudition and it has no pretense to 
exhaustiveness. The paper’ first intention is to prove a hypothesis, and it has succeeded in 
doing so. These findings in the primary and secondary sources demonstrate that the joint-
stock boom was truly pan-European, stretching from Lisbon to Saint Petersburg, and from 
Sicily to Sweden (Figure 1). Even though the survey is only partial the number of countries 
involved in the stock euphoria is already multiplied more than fivefold. We started with four 
(France, Britain, the United Provinces, Hamburg) or five (including Ireland), and we have 
now twenty-seven.  
Here is the list of the twenty-two additional countries: Austria, the Austrian Netherlands, 
Brunswick, Denmark, Eastern Frisia, Geneva, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Lorraine, Milan, 
Naples, Palatinate, Papal States, Piedmont-Sardinia, Portugal, Russia, Sicily, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Tuscany, and Venice (see the appendix for the sources). 
To what extent may we use the word ‘country’ when referring to a city such as 
Hamburg, a principality such as Brunswick, or a state under foreign rule such as the 
Austrian Netherlands? We can, in the early modern context. Hamburg and Brunswick 
(similarly to the Palatinate, Hesse, Hanover, and Eastern Frisia) had a peculiar political 
status that constituted a form of quasi-sovereignty, the so-called imperial immediacy of the 
Holy Roman Empire. Although the Southern Netherlands, Milan, Naples, and Sicily were 
                                                
41 Amsterdamsche Argus, July 1720 (n. 7), August 1721 (n. 12); Applebee Journal, 30 July 1720; Haerlemsche courant, 
12 September 1720; Daily Journal, 10 July 1721; etc. For the full list, see Appendix I. 
42 Amsterdamse courant, 19 October 1720; British Gazetteer, 23 July 1720; Haerlemsche courant, 5 and 29 October 
1720; Lettres historiques, January 1721, p. 119; Historical register, 1723, XXIX, p. 116-135. 
43 Amsinck, ‘Die ersten hamburgischen’, p. 477. 
44 The archives of the French India Company were burnt in 1722; the 1755 Lisbon earthquake destroyed 
part of the Portuguese crown’s financial records; the 1966 flood of the Arno River damaged most of Florence 
commercial records from 1720, etc.  
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under Austrian rule, they were distinct polities, with their own political institutions, 
jurisdictions, privileges, budget, population, official language and territory. 
I am convinced that more countries were involved in the joint-stock boom. Research in 
the archives of the many German states would likely yield good results, and it would not be 
surprising to learn that projectors also contacted the court of Poland or the Knights of 
Malta. Moreover, although Islamic law only recognized natural persons and thus did not 
provide a priori an optimal basis for corporate organization,45 we cannot exclude that 
projectors had similarly approached the Ottoman Empire, the Barbary States, and perhaps 
even Persia. In any case, the Muslim world was certainly aware of the boom in financial 
and commercial initiatives going on in Christian Europe. Contemporary reports state that 
the Ottomans were interested (and, apparently, even participated) in the Austrian Oriental 
Company venture.46 It also seems that the bey of Tunis had approached John Law and had 
offered to sell him the island of Tabarca.47  
What has struck me so far is that I have uncovered projects for joint-stock companies 
wherever I searched for them. They were sometimes difficult to find, but they were indeed 
present. To take one example, there are no records of financial or commercial authorities 
(the most obvious place where to find proposals for joint-stock companies) for 1720 
Florence,48 yet looking through the many letters received by the Tuscan government that 
year, I had the chance to spot a ‘progetto’ that a certain Antonio Prandone, who declared 
to be an Italian gentleman freshly arrived from London, had sent to the Grand Duke in 
May 1720.49 
 
The crucial role of the governments 
It was not possible at the time to create a joint-stock company without some form of official 
approval (Britain being the exception50), and this explains why these schemes are mostly 
                                                
45 Kuran, ‘The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law’, 2005. 
46 St Jame’s Journal, 2 January 1720 (quoted by Dickson, The Financial, cit., p. 138); Post Boy, 11 May 1721; 
Lettres historiques, May 1721, p. 536; Gaceta de Madrid, 20 May 1721; Mercure historique, June 1721 p. 720. Per 
contra, Post Boy, 27 July 1721. 
47 Trintzius, John Law, 1950, p. 100. Unfortunately, the author does not quote his source. 
48 In Tuscany, at the time, there was no centralized institution that supervised financial matters besides the 
Tribunale della mercanzia. Its records for March-December 1720 were lost in the 1966 Arno River flood. 
49 Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Mediceo del principato, Lettere di particolari 1140, c. 317. 
50 For discussion about the unincorporated joint-stock company see in particular Scott, Constitution, cit.; 
DuBois, The English business company, cit.; Harris, Industrializing English law, 2000. 
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found today in official archives. The state played therefore all over Europe a key role in the 
1720 joint-stock boom. Yet, the complex dynamics between rulers, projectors, and all the 
other financial actors differed significantly from one country to the other. 
The first challenge for a projector was to find the right channel to convey his ideas to the 
government. Antonio Prandone managed to send his plan to the Grand Duke thanks to the 
good offices of the governor of Livorno; a syndicate of Dutch investors entrusted the 
Spanish ambassador in The Hague with their project for a Spanish enterprise;51 another 
Dutch syndicate dispatched instead a spokesman (Louis le Maingre de Bouciquault, a 
Huguenot cavalry colonel who had developed strong ties with the Spanish government) 
directly to Madrid.52 To enhance the appeal of their proposals, some wealthy syndicates 
supplemented them with different types of financial incentives. Thus, a group of London 
businessmen informed the governor of the Austrian Netherlands that he would receive ‘an 
offer of acknowledgement and gratitude’ if he helped them secure an imperial charter for 
their proposed Ostend Company.53  In order to get a patent for a company with a 
monopoly on the trade with the Spanish Indies, a French syndicate offered to the king of 
Spain a gift of 30 million pieces of eight, approximately £8.5 million54 (to compare, in 
Britain at the same time, to the £300,000 that the London Assurance offered to the king for 
a marine insurance charter, or the £7.5 million promised by the South Sea Company for 
the privilege of proposing a debt-to-equity swap to the government creditors).55 
Once a government took officially into consideration a scheme, decision came sometimes 
quickly. The Consiglio di Finanze in Turin gave its consent to a project for a trading company 
in a matter of days (February 1721).56 The project for the Emden Company was submitted 
to the local authorities in September 1720, and it was already floated in October.57 Most of 
the time, though, the process was long. In Madrid, following its usual procedure, the crown 
constituted a special junta (committee) to examine the various corporate projects: first in July 
1720 and again in October.58 In Lisbon, official meetings on the ‘Brazil bubble’ started in 
February 1720 and were still going on in June 1721.59 In the United Provinces, the States 
                                                
51 AGS, Estado leg. 6192, 25 July 1720. 
52 Gazette d’Amsterdam, 12 and 16 July, 18 October 1720. 
53 Huisman, La Belgique commerciale, cit., p. 176. 
54 NA, SP 94/90, 28 October 1720. Mercurii relation, 9 November 1720. 
55 LMA, CLC/ B/ 192/ MS 8727 A, p. 35; Dickson, Financial Revolution, cit., p. 100. 
56 AST, Consiglio di Stato, Consiglio di finanze 1721-22, c. 23-24. The scheme for  
57 See appendix I. 
58 NA, SP 94/89, 22 July, 7 October 1720. 
59 See appendix I. 
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General deliberated for months (both in general assemblies and secret committees) about 
the so-called ‘Dutch Mississippi’, namely a public debt-for-equity swap.60 
These Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch schemes all foundered, but for different reasons. 
The Madrilenian juntas were intrinsically hostile to the idea of a firm with a monopoly on 
colonial trade, and they declared that the plans were ‘impracticable’.61 In the Dutch 
Republic, the States General could not reach an agreement, especially because Amsterdam, 
together with Holland, was opposed to the debt conversion.62 In Portugal, the king and his 
ministers supported the idea of a Brazil Company. However, they faced a dilemma: they 
thought that the ‘New Christians’ (descendent of Jewish families that had been forced to 
convert in the fifteenth century, and that were generally suspected of crypto-Judaism)63  
would be the only Portuguese able to invest substantial sums in the venture, but the New 
Christians requested safeguards and immunity from the Inquisition in order to do so.64 The 
crown could neither convince, nor force the Inquisition and the rest of the clergy to accept 
such a solution. The alternative was to widely open to foreign capital the initial public 
offering of shares (IPO), with the risk that the companies would ‘fall into the hands of 
foreigners’, which the government opposed.65 It discussed the matter for months, but no 
solution was found. 
Conversely, rulers in Austria, Lorraine, Brunswick, Hanover, Hesse, or the Palatinate 
were the driving force behind the new enterprises there. In France, the state not only 
fostered the Indies Company, it also did all it could to shore up its share price – especially 
after John Law had become finance minister in January 1720.66 Likewise, the Bubble Act 
has been interpreted as an attempt by the British parliament to prevent new firms from 
                                                
60 French and British diplomats, as well as Spanish spies, closely followed the discussions: AAE, CP Hollande 
343, c. 244, 249; AGS, Estado 6192, 24 July 1720, and Considerations sur le nouveau sistème des finances, p. 8 and 
13; NA, SP 84/273, 10 and 28 June 1720; NA, SP 84/274, 5, 7 and 8 July 1720. See also St Jame’s Evening 
Post, 2 June 1720; Daily Post, 27 June 1720; Post Man, 2 July 1720; British Gazetteer, 11 June 1720; Corriere di 
Vienna, 27 July 1720.  
61 According to the well-informed British ambassador in Madrid: NA, SP 94/89, 29 July 1720. 
62 This was in particular the analysis of the well-informed British diplomat: NA, SP 84/273, 10 and 28 June 
1720. 
63 On the complex question of Portuguese New Christians: Saraiva, The Marrano Factory, 2011. 
64 The question of safeguards for the New Christians had already been an important issue at the time of the 
floatation of the Portuguese India Company (1628) and the Portuguese Brazil Company (1649): Boxer, ‘Padre 
António Vierira’, 1949; Disney, ‘The First Portuguese India Company’, 1977; Costa, ‘Merchant groups in the 
17th-century Brazilian sugar trade’, 2004. 
65 The whole matter is explained in a long account that a British diplomat sent to London: NA, SP 89/28, c. 
124. 
66 Velde, ‘Government Equity’, cit, p. 28-30. 
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competing with the South Sea Company on the stock market.67 
Yet, the importance of the state should not be exaggerated. The Venetian case 
underlines that governments could not do much by themselves. In February 1719, a group 
of Venetian businessmen submitted to the senate a scheme for a manufacturing and trading 
company. After careful examination, the senate gave its approval (June 1719), considering 
that it was ‘a commendable idea’ to learn from the ‘most attentive nations’ (namely Holland 
and England), and to introduce in Venice ‘the method of the corporation, that is to say 
erecting a company’. 68  The decision and its motivation contradict (at least for the 
eighteenth century) what Massimo Costantini has argued regarding the opposition of the 
Venetian government to joint-stock firms.69 Costantini though this opposition was due to 
political reasons, for the aristocracy – who controlled the senate – did not wish to open 
space for the new moneyed men who were behind these corporations. In our case, the 
government did more than give its consent; it also tried to prompt the projectors to take 
action. They had started the manufacturing and trade business, but on a small scale and as 
a simple partnership. In August 1720, the senate urged them not to ‘delay anymore’ 
offering the shares to the public.70 The firm opened its books in September, and the shares 
were oversubscribed.71 According to a British newspaper, the directors even considered the 
possibility of launching a second subscription.72 However, the whole IPO suddenly aborted 
around the end of the month. 
I could not find in the primary sources any document explaining what had happened.73 
The stream of worrying news coming from the London stock market, during those same 
days, had possibly triggered a shift in investors’ appetite for speculative ventures. A sudden 
spike in the Venice-Amsterdam and Venice-London exchange rates also suggests that 
Venice had started to experience a severe liquidity crisis.74 In October-November, the crisis 
                                                
67 Harris, ‘The Bubble Act’, cit. 
68 ASV, V Savi, scritture dei deputati al commercio 213, c. 27-30. 
69 Costantini, ‘Commercio e marina’, 1998, p. 600-601. The author mentions (p. 600) this manufacturing 
and trading company, but gives a wrong archival reference. 
70 ASV, V Savi, scritture dep. com. 213, c. 146 sq. 
71 Gazzetta di Bologna, 3 September 1720; Applebee Journal, 10 September 1720; Gazette de Leyde, 13 September 
1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 13 September 1720; Daily Courant, 15 September, 1720; Lettres historiques, October 
1720 p. 407; Gazeta de Lisboa, 7 November 1720. 
72 Post Boy, 6 October 1720. 
73 I have searched in vain in the Archvio di Stato di Venezia, Biblioteca del Museo Correr, and Biblioteca 
Marciana, contemporary letters or pamphlets commenting on the aborted subscription.  
74 Neal, Financial, cit., p. 67, has called an ‘Ashton effect’ this characteristic ‘signature’ of 18th century 
exchange markets. For the exchange rates: FGR 1720 price database (see references). 
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(connected to the wider European financial upheaval) worsened so much that it temporarily 
paralyzed commerce and brought a series of bankruptcies among major Venetian 
merchants.75 It is quite possible that one of the first consequences of the liquidity downturn 
had been to cool down investors’ confidence and sink the IPO. The senate attempted to 
revive the project in 1721, but did not succeed.76 
The question of the dynamics between governments, projectors, companies, and equity 
markets during the 1720 bubble would deserve a paper by itself, and I will not expand it 
further here. What emerges from this brief overview is the diversity of situations and 
outcomes. The joint-stock boom was a pan-European phenomenon, yet specific national 
economic and political environments shaped and conditioned the various undertakings. 
The recipe – what the Venetians called ‘the method of the corporation’ – was apparently 
the same, but some ingredients (government agenda, political equilibria, size and 
experience of local capital markets, potential role of foreign projectors and investors, etc.) 
were not. However, we will see that the actors probably also considered the issue the other 
way around: they thought the ‘method of the corporation’ was the ingredient and that it 
was possible to arrange it in many different ways. 
 
Three groups of joint-stock schemes  
How can the different joint-stock schemes be categorized? Synthesizing what we have said 
so far, we may divide them in three main groups. The first comprises the ‘bubbles’ (as the 
contemporaries called them), i.e. undertakings that gave rise to some form of intense 
speculation and market boom. The Venetian company belongs here: the first phase of its 
floatation was a public success; its capital was oversubscribed (on paper) and in the process 
the Serenissima experienced for a few days its own stock fever. The firm established by the 
duke of Lorraine belongs here too: its shares were successfully issued and actively traded. 
Newspapers reported that foreigners sent six millions livres (approximately £225,000) to 
Nancy in order to participate in the venture. At its peak, around 12 November 1720, the 
stock gained 40%.77  
The Portuguese and Spanish schemes also belong to the ‘bubbles’ group. Although none 
of them even reached flotation stage, they nonetheless provoked considerable ‘excitement’ 
                                                
75 AAE, CP Venise 173, c. 353, 378. 
76 ASV, V Savi, scritture dep. com. 213, c. 197. 
77 Gazette d’Amsterdam, 12 November 1720; Lettres historiques, November 1720, p. 606. 
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and ‘heat’ among international investors.78 The Lisbon-London exchange rate started to 
surge in May 1720, and reached a peak early September as British capital poured into 
Portugal; 79  the Lisbon-Amsterdam rate peaked in the same days (Figures 8 and 9). 
Moreover, in the expectation that something big would happen, several speculators, 
including James Edward Oglethorpe (the future founder of Georgia), came to Portugal ‘to 
try their fortune’.80 A similar process happened in Spain: capital flows into the country left a 
huge ‘signature’ in the Spanish exchange rate (Figures 8 and 9). It is noteworthy that the 
strong appreciation of the Cadiz-on-Amsterdam rate, in the summer and again the autumn 
of 1720, happened while the juntas were examining the schemes that had been submitted to 
the king (see supra). Four different Dutch syndicates each presented a project, and there is 
evidence that they remitted large sums to Spain to add credibility to their plans. This spike 
in the Spanish exchange rate cannot be explained by any other significant factor besides the 
joint-stock schemes (contrarily to the March 1720 spike that was directly connected to the 
end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance and the reopening of trade between Spain and 
her former enemies, Britain, the Dutch Republic, and France). 
 
 
Table 1. Three groups of joint-stock schemes 
1. That generated some form of intense speculation and market boom (‘bubbles’). 
2. That gave birth to a company but not to a bubble. 
3. That foundered without generating any significant wave of speculation. 
 
The second group of joint-stock undertakings includes those that gave birth to a company, 
but that did not generate any market frenzy. The Austrian Imperial Oriental Company is 
here the most interesting example. Charles VI granted it many privileges, in particular the 
monopoly for wholesale trade with the Ottoman Empire (through the Danube and the 
Austrian seaports on the Adriatic Sea) and for several industries (shipyards, sugar refinery, 
cannon production, textile manufactures). 81  The company opened offices in Vienna, 
Belgrade, Trieste, Fiume, Messina, as well as Istanbul, and newspapers regularly reported 
                                                
78 A British diplomat in Lisbon uses these expressions: NA, SP 89/28, 14 October 1720. 
79 Another British diplomat mentions a 20% increase in the exchange rate: ibid., 15 October 1720. On the 
great rise of the Portuguese exchange rate (and, as a consequence, foreign gold in London), also a letter of 
George Middleton to William Law (August 1720): CA, Coutts Letter Book O 14, p. 329. I am grateful to 
Larry Neal for giving me the transcript of this letter book.  
80 NA, SP 89/28, 11 November 1720. 
81 Huisman, La Belgique commerciale, cit., p. 156-157; Daily Courant, 29 April 1720. 
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that its ships were sailing on the Danube or the Mediterranean.82 According to the English 
press, the firm looked so mighty that it gave ‘umbrage’ to the Dutch, who feared it would 
interfere with the East India trade (through the Black and Caspian Seas).83 Still, in spite of 
all its privileges, the corporation had serious difficulties in raising capital. The subscription 
seems to have been a half-failure, and the emperor, several Austrian princes, and the Bank 
of Vienna had to step in to buy shares.84 In 1721, a new bid to attract capital, this time 
through a lottery, was equally unsuccessful.85  
The emperor tried to call on some of his traditional German sources of funding, and it 
would be interesting to understand if he had attempted to approach other international 
investors.86 For sure, he had not been as bold as the duke of Brunswick, who opened the 
subscription for his lottery in a London coffeehouse, and used his ambassador in England to 
negotiate with potential investors in his bank and company.87 Anyhow, considering its 
strong growth prospects and the general context of the 1720 stock fever, the lack of 
speculative interest in the Imperial Company is puzzling. It is not clear if the enterprise was 
profitable. 88  However, that year, countless corporations (including the South Sea 
Company)89 attracted capital and were heavily traded despite poor commercial results. Of 
course, the non-existent Viennese equity market could not compare with Exchange Alley 
(the London stock market), and investors could have expected to have their property rights 
better safeguarded in England than in Austria. Yet, property rights protection was in some 
respects even poorer in France and Portugal, and that did not prevent speculation there. In 
1703, Austria tried to repudiate the enormous sums it owed to the banker Samuel 
Oppenheimer, but it only managed to reschedule them.90 On the contrary, France had a 
                                                
82 E.g. Corriere di Vienna, 18 September 1720, 26 July and 20 August 1721; Lettres Historiques, October 1720 
p. 428; Gazeta de Lisboa, 13 February 1721. 
83 Daily Post, 28 December 1719; Daily Courant, 26 December 1719. 
84 Daily Post, 4 October 1720; Gazzetta di Bologna, 8 October 1720. On the Bank of Vienna: Di Vittorio, ‘Un 
capitolo’, 1974, p. 18-27; Ingrao, The Habsburg monarchy, cit., p. 127. 
85 Corriere di Vienna, 30 April 1721; Roider, ‘Reform’, cit., p. 319. 
86 The emperor tried to get investors from Hamburger to invest in the company in 1719: Baasch ‘Hamburg 
und die Compagnie von Ostende’, 1897, p. 310. I am grateful to Daniel Menning for giving me this 
information. 
87 Daily Courant, January 27, 1720; NSAW, 2 Old No 6542 and 6543. 
88 Ingrao writes that the company was profitable in its early year, whereas Roider argues that it was 
hampered by high costs, and that it could not compete against Ottoman merchants: Ingrao, The Habsburg, cit., 
p. 140; Roider, ‘Reform’, cit., p. 318-319. 
89 It is unclear if the South Sea Company had made any profit from its foundation (1711) up to 1720: 
Wennerlind, Casualties, cit., p. 223. 
90 Di Vittorio, ‘Un capitolo’, cit., p. 6-8; McCagg, A history of Habsburg Jews, 1988, p. 17-18. 
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long record of effectively defaulting on its debt and inflicting harsh punishments to its 
financiers.91 In Lisbon, the inquisitor-general, cardinal da Cunha, openly spoke about 
seizing the funds of Jews and ‘heretics’ who might invest in the prospective Portuguese 
companies.92 The fact that the Oriental Company’s floatation took place in September 
1720 (i.e. after the crash in London and Amsterdam) does not hold either: the same crash 
did not prevent the market boom in Lorraine in November (see supra). Research in the 
Austrian archives might shed light on the whole matter, and help explain why financial 
markets were not interested in the Viennese firm. 
The Milanese Casa di San Giuseppe belongs to the second group as well. Its projectors, the 
entrepreneur Ronzio and the count Borromeo Arrese, had designed, with the support of the 
governor of Lombardy, a grand scheme to jump-start the Milanese economy. The company 
was supposed to be the first stage of this plan, to be followed by other projects such as 
building a canal between the city and the Po and developing trade with Austria.93 The 
firm’s capital (4 million lire divided in 800 shares) was subscribed, but there was no boom in 
the stock. It began manufacturing and exporting textiles and soap in 1720, but it soon 
encountered fierce opposition from the local guilds, and it closed down around 1722.94 
The Bank of Brunswick and the Kassel Company are also part of the second group. The 
Bank of Brunswick was effectively established, but its stock did not meet with great 
enthusiasm;95 the Kassel undertaking was not actively traded, but it started operations and 
remained active until the mid-nineteenth century.96  
The third category – the largest among the ‘peripheral’ countries  – covers all the 
schemes that foundered without giving birth to a company and without generating any 
significant wave of speculation. It includes insurance undertakings in Denmark, the 
Austrian Netherlands, and the Papal States; banks in Russia and Piedmont; trading firms in 
Bern, Geneva, Mannheim, and Turin; China companies in Sweden and Russia; Levant 
companies in Venice and Sicily; East India companies in Naples, Messina, Altona, and 
Antwerp. 
 
                                                
91 The last episode had been the 1715-1716 Chambre de Justice and visa: White, ‘France and the Failure to 
Modernize’, 2001; Legay, La banqueroute de l’État royal, 2011; Béguin, Financer la guerre au XVIIe siècle, 2012. 
92 NA, SP 89/28, 14 October 1720. Also Carswell, The South Sea, cit., p. 119. 
93 See appendix I and Lettres historiques, October 1720 p. 430. 
94 See appendix I. 
95 Journal historique, March 1721 p. 207; Lettres historiques, February 1721 p. 172. 
96 See appendix I. 
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The ‘core countries’  
The ‘bubbles’ group is the largest by far when we add the ‘core countries’ into the picture. 
In Hamburg, two marine insurance companies were floated in July 1720, their shares 
raising more than 100% in a week (a third one was projected but not floated).97 In England, 
out of 194 undertakings promoted in 1719-1720, probably more than 150 were effectively 
subscribed and traded.98 Among them, twenty-one stocks increased by more than 1,000%. 
Adding the three Scottish contemporary ventures (the Society of the subscribed Equivalent 
Debt;99 the Edinburgh society for insuring houses; 100 the Co-partnery for the Fishing 
Trade101), Britain as a whole accounted for 196 projects. Ireland accounted for five: three 
competing schemes for a bank, and two plans for a fire insurance company. 102 
Historiography had hitherto identified forty-one new projects for the United Provinces, all 
promoted in 1720.103 I find that the Dutch joint-stock boom started already in 1719 when 
at least three undertakings for a trading company were submitted to the States of 
Friesland.104 Out of these forty-four schemes, there were thirty successful IPOs, and the 
stock price of eleven of them was up 100% or more at its peak.105  
In this review, I am not considering firms floated long before 1719, such as the Dutch 
West India Company (1675), the Bank of England (1694), the merged East India Company 
                                                
97 NA, SP 82/37, c. 108-123; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 23 July 1720; Gazette de Leyde, 23 July 1720; La Gazette, 3 
and 10 August 1720; Nouveau Mercure, July 1720 p. 91; Post Boy, 12, 16 July 1720. 
98 I estimate these numbers on the basis of the contemporary press, as well as Anderson, An historical and 
chronological deduction, [1762] 1801, III, p. 103; Scott, Constitution, cit.; Frehen et al., ‘New evidence’, cit., 
appendix I.  
99 Scott, Constitution, cit., III, p. 269-271. 
100 In spite of its name, this was not an insurance firm, but a competitor to the Bank of Scotland: Scott, 
Constitution, cit., III, p. 271; Conant, A history of modern banks, 1915, p. 144-145; Saville, Bank of Scotland, 1996, p. 
85-86. 
101 Records of the Convention the Royal Burghs of Scotland, 1885, p. 245 sq.; Scott, Constitution, cit., III, p. 458; 
Harris, ‘Scotland’s Herring Fisheries’, 2000. 
102 See footnote 27, as well as Applebee’s Weekly Journal, 3 September 1720; British Gazetteer, 16 July, 13 August 
1720; Corriere di Vienna, 14 September 1720 and 6 December 1721; Daily Post, 18 July 1720; Evening Post, 9 July 
1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 2, 6 August 1720; La Gazette, 3, 10 August 1720; Weekly Packet, 16 July 1720. 
103 Gelderblom and Jonker, ‘Mirroring’, cit., Table 8.1. I add the Berbice Company to this list. On the 
beginnings of this company: HaNA, Sociëteit van Berbice, 1.05.05, inv. 13, 398, 404, 409, 439. Corriere di 
Vienna, 9 and 16 November 1720. Hartsinck, Beschryving van Guiana, 1770, p. 320-331. 
104  Fries Historisch en Letterkundig Centrum (Leeuwarden), Familie thoe Schwartzenberg en 
Hohenlansberg, 326, 3735. The document mentions ‘various projects’. The term ‘various’ implies that they 
were more than two, but probably not many more. I opt therefore for a conservative hypothesis of three 
projects. 
105 Gelderblom and Jonker, ‘Mirroring’, cit., Table 8.1; Frehen et al., ‘New evidence’, cit., appendix II. 
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(1708), or even the South Sea Company (1711). All these firms played a leading role in the 
1720 stock market boom, but they do not belong to the joint-stock boom that is investigated 
here. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in England, between January 1720 and their 
market peak (July-August), the share price of several new ventures (General Insurance 
+6,300%, London Assurance +4,320%, York Buildings +2,950%, Temple Brass Mills 
+2,400%, Royal Exchange Assurance +1,343%, etc.) increased much more than the price 
of the South Sea Company (+675%).106 On the contrary, in the United Provinces the ‘old’ 
West India Company was the market leader (+634%), leaving the most successful new 
stocks far behind: Middleburg Commercie (+406%), Schiedam (+325%), Edam 
(+300%).107 
The French Mississippi Company was a different case. Founded by John Law in August 
1717, its subscription was at first rather slow. It speeded up after the introduction of a 
speculative mechanism in June 1718 (subscribers could pay 20% of the price to secure an 
option on a share, the rest being payable within five months, else the loss of the initial 
investment), and it closed only on the 31st December 1718.108 On that date, the stock traded 
around 40% below par. It reached its peak exactly one year later, after a 3,300% price 
increase.109 The Mississippi Company progressively grew into a huge conglomerate through 
several merger or acquisitions. I would argue that two of these operations would qualify as 
new schemes: the takeover of the French China and East India companies (May 1719) and 
the merger with the Royal Bank (February 1720). After the takeover, the firm’s business 
became not only larger, but also different (trade with the Americas and trade with Asia 
were far from being comparable businesses). Significantly, John Law chose then a new 
name for his conglomerate: Compagnie des Indes (Indies Company). After the merger with the 
Bank, the company transformed itself again, this time into an enterprise that had no 
equivalent in Europe. 
The years 1719-20 saw seven other French undertakings. Two of them, effectively 
floated and traded, were founded by John Law’s rivals: the General Farms Company 
(directed by the Pâris brothers),110 and the Provence Canal Company (patronized by 
                                                
106 Scott, Constitution, cit., I, p. 419-421. 
107 Frehen et al., ‘New evidence’, cit., appendix II. 
108 Velde, ‘Government’, cit., p. 14. 
109 FGR 1720 price database. 
110 AN, K885, 1, Mémoire personnel aux sieurs Pâris; Bibliothèque Méjanes, ms. 617, Discours de M. Pâris; AST, 
Lettere dei ministri, Francia, 147. Gazette d’Amsterdam, 18 November 1718; Gazette de Leyde, 6 June 1719. 
  22 
Antoine Crozat).111 Five other ventures were discussed but not implemented. John Law 
himself designed two of these: a grand fishing enterprise (the so-called North Company),112 
and an insurance company.113 The three other ventures were: a plan to construct a canal 
between the Rhône and Loire rivers;114 the gigantic corporation imagined by E. L. de La 
Jonchère (the projected capital was six billion livres, that is ~£0.45 billion);115 and an 
undertaking promoted by De Beauchamp, an English banker based in Brussels.116 To sum 
up, I will consider ten projects for France: three transmutations of the Mississippi Company 
and seven new enterprises. 
 
What the maps reveal 
The ten French projects, together with the other 326 joint-stock undertakings from all over 
Europe, appear on Figure 1. To make the map clearer, the three groups defined supra are 
condensed into two main categories. Thus, the orange circles represent the ‘bubbles’ (group 
1 of Table 1), whereas the white circles symbolize the countries where the schemes did not 
generate any significant speculation (groups 2 and 3).  
With 58% of the total, England is by far the first for the number of projects, followed by 
the Dutch Republic (13%). With all its possessions (Austria, Austrian Netherlands, Milan, 
Naples and Sicily), the Habsburg Empire comes third (8%). Spain is fourth (4%) and France 
fifth (3%). Italy as a whole represents 4.5% of the total versus 4% for Germany. These 
percentages are only provisional indications, as there were almost certainly other 
undertakings and possibly also other countries involved. Yet, there is no doubt that, 
whatever the result of future research, England and the United Provinces will still largely 
dominate the landscape. 
To put the 1720 joint-stock euphoria into perspective, it is noteworthy that 40% of all 
the European IPOs of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took place on that single 
                                                
111 BM, Add. ms. 20316, c. 162. Gazette d’Amsterdam, 28 May 1720; Gazette de Leyde, 17 March 1719; Journal 
historique, April 1719 p. 238, January 1720 p. 51. Elie, ‘La spéculation sous la Régence’, 1953. 
112 NA, SP 78/165, c. 428; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 17 and 21 November 1720. 
113 Marmont du Hautchamp, Histoire du systeme, 1739, VI, p. 109-113 publishes the text of the edict that 
established the company. See also Leydse Courant, 17 June 1720. 
114 AN, G7 599, 5 February 1720. 
115 NA, SP 78/165, c. 410-428; 78/166, c. 420. Lécuyer de la Jonchère, Système d'un nouveau gouvernement, 
1720. 
116 AAE, CP Bruxelles, 81, c. 153-155. Although we don’t have the details, it seems highly improbabe that 
this project, whose aim was to supersede Law’s System, did not include the creation of a joint-stock company. 
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year.117 This computation only takes into account corporations that were effectively floated, 
as it would be almost impossible to review all the joint-stock schemes promoted during these 
two centuries (i.e. including group n. 3 of Table 1). Anyhow, even considering only the 
effective IPOs, 1720 stands out as an exceptional year (Figures 6 and 7). The previous joint-
stock boom of 1692-1696 (a purely British phenomenon) pales by comparison. 
Figure 2 underlines the geographical difference between the joint-stock boom and the 
financial markets boom (equity and foreign exchange): the first really spanned across the 
continent; the second was more concentrated. To highlight the specific distribution of the 
latter, I have given a score to the orange circles based on a simple model. [Model to be 
described here.] Linking the orange circles according to their latitude gives an interesting 
perspective on the global bubble. The North Sea line (from London to Hamburg and 
Hanover) adds together a score of 22; the continental line (from Paris to Lorraine) accounts 
for twelve; the Mediterranean line (from Lisbon to Venice) amounts to three. Clearly, the 
1720 market fever had been primarily a northern phenomenon. 
Returning to Figure 1, we see that the joint-stock boom also took place mostly along the 
North Sea. Including the Austrian Netherlands, Emden (East Frisia), Hanover, and Altona 
(the city, situated a few kilometers from Hamburg, were the two Danish companies were 
promoted), then 80% of all the new schemes were located along the London-Hamburg axis. 
Therefore, and not so surprisingly, the stock market boom and the joint-stock boom mostly 
overlapped. 
The two maps also highlight the special situation of the Austrian Netherlands. It was 
probably not a coincidence if the third largest cluster of undertakings after England and the 
United Provinces was located next to these two nations, as well as in the center of the 
triangle formed by Paris, London, and Amsterdam, the three most active stock exchanges in 
1719-20. Yet, no ‘bubble’ emerged in the Austrian-dominated part of the Netherlands, and 
this probably was not a coincidence either. We noted the puzzling lack of speculative 
interest for the Oriental Company. For reasons that still have to be elucidated, there was no 
market frenzy anywhere in the Habsburg Empire. In Belgium, the complex political 
equilibrium between Brussels and Vienna chiefly explains why none of the seventeen local 
schemes managed to take off in 1720 (the Ostend Company was floated only in 1723 after 
                                                
117 The list of the English IPOs is mainly based on Scott, Constitution, cit.; and DuBois, The English business 
company, cit. The list for the rest of Europe is drawn from a multitude of sources, in particular Savary des 
Brûlons, Dictionnaire universel de commerce, 1759-65; Table générale du Journal historique, 1759; Bonnassieux, Les 
grandes compagnies de commerce, 1892. Despite my best efforts, I have almost certainly missed some 17th or 18th 
century IPOs. Yet, I consider that these would not be sufficiently numerous to significantly alter the relative 
importance of the year 1720.   
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much deliberation within the imperial government).118 Therefore, the apparent Belgian 
anomaly – on the one hand, a large number of ventures; on the other, an absence of 
speculation in spite of its proximity to the Paris-London-Amsterdam triangle – was the 
result of the peculiar geopolitical situation of a country that belonged, economically, to the 
dynamic North-Sea area and, politically, to the more conservative Habsburg Empire. 
 
 
Financial innovation and its diffusion 
Two financial innovations 
What is the point of studying stranded projects and foundered IPOs? Why, as economic 
and financial historians, should we take them into account? My thesis is that these 
undertakings are meaningful despite their ultimate failure. Firstly, as underlined above, they 
attest to the pan-European dimension of the euphoria on which the bubble rode. Secondly, 
leaving aside the question of whether their stock was traded or not, it is interesting to 
compare all the new firms promoted around 1720: patterns and trends emerge, that had 
not been identified previously, and that shed new light on the global boom. The paper will 
address two issues in particular: the business sectors in which the companies were (or could 
have been) engaged and the timing of their (successful or unsuccessful) launch. 
Let us start with the business sectors. The 1719-1720 boom saw two financial 
innovations.119 The first was related to public finance. It is well known that both John Law’s 
scheme in France and the South Sea scheme in Britain were based on the exchange of 
public debt for stocks. We noted above that a comparable debt-for-equity swap (the so-
called ‘Dutch Mississippi’) had been proposed and debated at length in the United 
Provinces. It is compelling to discover that similar projects were promoted in the Austrian 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Lorraine, and Piedmont. Moreover, in most countries 
involved in the join-stock boom, some, if not all, new ventures were geared to the 
government’s efforts to increase its income and reduce its debts.  
In Brussels, for instance, Marsaut and Du Péray (two French financiers apparently 
connected to John Law) proposed to the imperial government a plan to pay off all public 
debts in four years (spring 1720). Upon reading the project, a senior official wrote 
                                                
118 Huisman, La Belgique, cit., p. 159-179. 
119 On the importance of innovation for explaining investor optimism during the 1720 bubble: Frehen et al., 
‘New evidence’, cit. 
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enthusiastically to Vienna saying that the emperor had found ‘a second Law’. A few months 
later, a syndicate of English businessmen presented to the imperial ambassador in London a 
scheme to erect in Ostend a company that would be, at the same time, a marine insurance 
business and an East India venture. The scheme provided also that the company would 
lend, with a low interest rate, the sums the government might require, in particular to buy 
back the loan (12 million guilders) that the United Provinces had granted to the Austrian 
Netherlands.120  
In Lisbon (October 1720), Thomas Burnett, the British resident, explained in a letter 
sent to London that:121 
 
The noise of the gains by Mississippi and South Sea, and that easy method of clearing publick 
debts, induced the marques d’Abrantes, the principal favorite of this court, to propose the 
erection of a company, in order to pay off the debts of this crown, and put a considerable sum 
of money in the king’s coffers for any emergency. 
 
In Madrid, the Dutch investors behind one of the most ambitious undertakings (a firm with 
a monopoly on the commerce with Spanish America and another monopoly on Spanish 
wool and iron trade) assured that the crown would gain 25 million in pieces of eight 
(approximately £5 million) if it accepted it. 122  Another Spanish scheme explicitly 
recommended that one sixth of the shares of the projected company might be exchanged 
for royal bonds ‘in order to facilitate the subscription and to imperceptibly pay off the king’s 
debts.’123 
In the project that prince Sčerbatov sent to the tsar in June 1720, he explained that the 
creation of a company and a bank (modeled on John Law’s System) would be beneficial to 
Russia, especially in time of war124: 
 
Your Majesty, he wrote, will get a great benefit from the transformation of specie into paper 
money. We need it greatly, especially now that we are at war and that money is used to 
maintain and expand Your Majesty’s armed forces for the defense against the enemy and the 
protection of the Russian state. The creation of a commercial company can develop, in due 
time, the Russian trade and increase Your Majesty’s revenues.  
                                                
120 Huisman, La Belgique commerciale, cit., p. 169-177. 
121 NA, SP 89/28, c. 124. I added the italics. 
122 NA, SP 94/89, 29 July 1720. 
123 AHNM, Estado leg. 3188, n. 415 (s.d. but clearly 1720). 
124 Quoted in Troickij, ‘Le système de John Law’, cit., appendix I, p. 63. 
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We could multiply examples like these. Clearly, French and British experiments with public 
finance engineering were part of a much larger phenomenon. Most European powers were 
then facing similar fiscal problems; they were struggling with unprecedented debt loads 
mostly accumulated during the previous wars, while they also needed fresh resources for 
new conflicts (the war of the Quadruple Alliance, the Spanish expedition in Morocco) or for 
old ones still going on (Great Northern War).  
The second innovation occurred in the insurance industry: 1720 can be considered the 
birth date of the first joint-stock corporations for insuring ships. The movement started in 
England, where two large companies, the London Assurance and the Royal Exchange 
Assurance, secured a royal charter; three other undertakings were not floated.125 Such was 
the craze for this innovation among investors that the stocks of the two corporations soared 
much higher than the shares of the South Sea Company (see above). Partly spurred by the 
British example, fifteen or possibly more marine insurance enterprises were projected in the 
United Provinces (some at the municipal level, such as the Rotterdam Company; some 
others at the national level, such as the schemes engineered by the broker De Souza 
Britto).126 In Hamburg, enthusiasm for joint-stock marine insurance underwriting was such 
that no other type of companies was promoted. 
 
 
Table 2. Number of joint-stock schemes related to marine insurance (1720) 
Dutch Republic  ~15 
Hamburg 3 
England 5 
Austrian Netherlands 1 
Denmark (Altona) 1 
East Frisia (Emden) 1 
Sources: see text.  
 
Until now, only these firms were known. We can add now three more countries to the list: 
the Austrian Netherland, Hamburg, and Eastern Frisia. As noted above, a syndicate of 
London merchants projected a firm for insuring ships in the Austrian Netherlands (Ostend). 
                                                
125 Drew, The London Assurance, 1949; Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 1970. 
126 Het groote Tafereel, 1720. Courrier politique, 20 September 1720; Europische mercurius, September 1720 p. 200; 
Gelderblom and Jonker, ‘Mirroring’, cit.; Frehen et al., ‘New evidence’, cit. 
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Investors from Hamburg promoted similar schemes in Denmark (Altona) 127 and Eastern 
Frisia (Emden).128  
According to a Dutch gazette, a concern for insuring ships had also been planned in 
Venice (August 1720). I could not find any other source reporting about it, and therefore I 
am not counting it in the review. Yet, the information seems plausible, as there had been 
two analogous projects in Venice in 1668 and 1681. The latter had effectively given birth to 
a chartered joint-stock enterprise. However, for some reason (likely because the senate had 
not granted it the monopoly that it had been seeking) the firm never started operations. It is 
possible that the idea of such a company was still in the air, and that it crystallized again in 
the wake of the 1720 euphoria. A comparable process had happened in the Dutch 
Republic, where plans for a marine insurance corporation had failed in 1628 and 1635,129 
and in England where a similar project had foundered in 1660.130 
Marine insurance required highly specialized knowledge (in particular about ships, 
captains, and sea routes), and private underwriters or partnerships that had this kind of 
intelligence had effectively operated it for centuries.131 The value of the joint-stock form – 
provided that the companies did not have a monopoly – was therefore less obvious in this 
industry than in fire or life insurance (that were primarily based on probabilities and large 
numbers). As none of the 1720 firms had such a monopoly, the explosion of interest for this 
type of corporation did not necessary make sense economically. With Michael Aldous we 
are currently working on this subject, and I will not expand it further here.  
Anyhow, there is no doubt that contemporaries perceived public companies for insuring 
ships as a promising advance that had to potential to transform not only that industry, but 
also trade in general, mainly because they thought these firms would be able to offer lower 
rates, quicker insurance, and better guarantees, thus providing a great benefit to the 
mercantile community.132  
The focus here is on innovation, but to put the 1720 joint-stock boom into perspective it 
is important to keep in mind that, overall, the largest business sector was a traditional one, 
                                                
127 Corriere di Vienna, 19 October 1720; Mercure historique, October 1720, p. 397. 
128 See appendix. Groeneveld (1940), and Gelderblom & Jonker (2010) mention the Emden Company, but 
without specifying that it was also involved in marine insurance. 
129 Spooner, Risks at sea, 1983, p. 24; Gelderblom & Jonker, ‘Mirroring’, p. 19.  
130 Raynes, A history of British insurance, 1948, p. 100-101. 
131 See for instance Straus, Lloyd’s, 1937, p. 42 sq.; Boiteux, La fortune de mer, 1968, p. 175-177; Clayton, British 
insurance, 1971, p. 55-56. 
132 See in particular LMA, Special Report from the committee appointed to enquire into the several subscriptions, 1720, p. 
26-32. Also Straus, Lloyd’s, p. 27-28.  
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namely commerce. More than 80% of all the schemes were related to commerce, and 
nearly 60% to long-distance trade. These percentages take into account the fact that several 
undertakings encompassed a range of different industries. For instance, the projected 
Belgian insurance company also comprised a bank and an East India concern; the activities 
of the Kassel firm went from manufacturing and regional trade to banking; the Russian 
enterprise projected by prince Sčerbatov embraced banking, tax farming, fisheries, and 
long-distance commerce. Conversely, all the Portuguese and Swedish schemes, and most 
Spanish projects, were only concerned with colonial trade. 
Long-distance commerce was also a prominent feature of the global stock market 
bubble.133 The Mississippi and the South Sea companies are the foremost examples, but 
several new English colonial ventures also experienced an impressive boom: the Bahama 
Islands Company (whose shares increased at their peak by 1,233% above par), the 
Pennsylvania Company (+662%), the undertaking to grow flax and hemp in Pennsylvania 
(+1,020%), or the Gold Mining Company (+3,100%) that was supposed to colonize 
Australia. 134  Likewise, speculation propelled the stocks of some of the mercantile 
corporations of the seventeenth century generation such as the Dutch West India 
Company, the Royal African Company, or the East India Company. To give just one 
example, the goldsmith-banker George Middleton wrote in one of his letters that English 
investors were ‘furiously’ buying East India stock on the prospect that it would embark on a 
‘new project […] for enlarging their trade by a settlement somewhere on the coast of 
Africa’ (the Ophir project mentioned above).135 
 
A two-speed Europe 
The two financial innovations of 1719-20 were differently distributed across Europe. 
Roughly speaking, debt-for-equity swaps highlight a political and military map (Figure 3), 
whereas marine insurance highlights an economic one (Figure 4). 
In the words of Thomas Burnett (see supra), debt-for-equity swaps had been designed as 
an ‘easy method of clearing publick debts’. In early modern times, large public debts were 
generally the result of military and diplomatic expenditures. It is therefore not surprising to 
                                                
133 Frehen et al., ‘New evidence’, Table 2, show that Atlantic trade was one of the industries with the highest 
maximum percentage price increase in Britain during the 1720 bubble.  
134 Scott, Constitution, I, cit., p. 420-421. 
135 CA, Coutts Letter Book O 14, p. 235, 16 June 1720. On the banker Middleton: Neal, ‘For God’s Sake, 
Remitt Me’, 1994; and I am not master of events, cit. 
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see that countries and city-states that had been mostly at peace in the previous decades 
(Tuscany, the Papal States, Switzerland, Geneva, Hamburg) do not appear on Figure 3. On 
the contrary, with the exception of Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria, all the major powers that 
had fought the long and costly War of Spanish Succession (Britain, France, the Dutch 
Republic, Spain, Piedmont, Portugal) are on the map. Lorraine had also been involved in 
the war, and its grand duke nourished territorial ambitions.136 The Austrian (formerly 
Spanish) Netherlands, although not an independent state, had been at the heart of the 
conflict and had consequently accumulated a considerable debt.  
Following the logic of Figure 3, one wonders if some projectors had not proposed similar 
debt conversion schemes to other military powers: Austria, Bavaria, Prussia, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Poland all come to mind. This would be quite plausible considering that these 
nations had been deeply engaged in costly wars, or were still fighting. Some sources suggest 
that contemporaries expected that Austria, at least, would be a prime target for projectors 
with debt swaps plans. ‘The projectors are at work [in Vienna] as well as in France and 
elsewhere, and several schemes have been offer’d for discharging the publick debts’ wrote 
an English journal.137 Even assuming that this was untrue (since no other source confirmed 
the information), it is telling that a newspaper would mention it. Moreover, after John Law 
had fled France (December 1720), there was a rumor that he had been invited to Austria to 
‘take care of the repayment of the emperor’s debts’.138 The imperial government vigorously 
denied it, yet the rumor persisted for a few days, and there were even reports saying that 
Law had arrived incognito in Vienna.139 
Turning now to Figure 4, it appears clearly that marine insurance companies only 
concerned a specific part of Europe; they were promoted along the same London-Hamburg 
ridge where the bulk of the joint-stock boom took place and where the financial market 
boom reached its highest intensity (Figures 1 and 2). Why only these countries? Why other 
maritime nations, such as France, Spain, Portugal, Genoa, etc., did not join a trend that 
seemed poised to transform commerce?140  
                                                
136 Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion de la Lorraine à la France, IV, 1860, p. 122. 
137 Weekly Packet, 4 June 1720. 
138 Gazette d’Amsterdam, 28 January 1721; Lettres historiques, January 1721, p. 113; Post Boy, 7 February 1721. 
139 Gazette d’Amsterdam, 31 January 1721.  
140 The 14 January 1721 (supplement) issue of the Gazette de Leyde mentions a Portuguese insurance scheme. 
However, as noted above, there is no other source confirming the information. Besides, the newspaper does 
not specify if the project was about fire or marine insurance. Likewise, John Law’s insurance scheme (see note 
113) did not mention marine insurance. 
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Until now, we have seen projects, euphoria and speculation spreading across the 
continent with little regard to national borders. On the contrary, we have now two parts of 
Europe looking in different directions. There is no easy way to explain why France, Spain, 
Portugal, etc. bypassed a novelty that was making so much noise along the North Sea. Yet, 
it is possible to narrow the problem by excluding two hypotheses: a) these countries were 
not aware of the innovation; b) they were not interested because they were using different 
naval methods (such as the Spanish or Portuguese convoy systems). 
Information circulated widely; there is no doubt about that. French, Spanish and other 
European gazettes wrote about the marine insurance boom in England, the Netherlands, 
and Hamburg.141 Even more significant, there are French and Spanish ships among the 
clients insured by the London Assurance as early as 1720.142  Clearly, the merchant 
communities in France and Spain were not only aware, but also directly interested in the 
services offered by joint-stock insurances. As a matter of fact, insurance patterns for ships 
were more or less homogeneous across Europe, and until the eighteenth century southern 
Europe had been active on the front of innovation. Spain (together with Italy) had been a 
frontrunner in the sixteenth century, and had developed insurance partnerships in the 
seventeenth century.143 France had also been a pioneer in the seventeenth century, with the 
creation of the Chambre des Assurances (1664): a hybrid corporation (société en comandite), half 
joint-stock and half partnership.144 Yet, the landscape had changed in 1720 and the front of 
innovation had decidedly moved to the north. 
Looking now to a different business sector, Figure 5 represents the states where all, or 
most (more than 75%), schemes were connected to long-distance and colonial trade (Table 
4). The map is particularly interesting when compared to Figure 4. Leaving aside for the 
moment the special cases of the Austrian Netherlands and Emden, there was a significant 
difference in development between the countries in the two maps. The nations and cities on 
Figure 4 were among the most ‘advanced’ economies of the time.145 Denmark as a whole 
might not have been so much ahead, but the city of Altona could be considered as a kind of 
extension of Hamburg. By contrast, none of the states in Figure 5 belonged to the group of 
                                                
141 E.g. Gaceta de Madrid, 2, 23 July, 13, 20 August 1720; La Gazette, 22, 29 June, 20 July, 3 August 1720; 
Nouveau Mercure, March 1720 p. 127, June 1720 p. 146, July 1720 p. 91, 94, 98, 102, August 1720 p. 157. 
142 LMA, CLC/B/192/MS 8729/1, p. 74. 
143 Pons Pons, ‘Compañías de seguro marítimo en España’, 2007. 
144 Levy-Bruhl, Histoire juridique, 1938, p. 39; Boiteux, L’assurance maritime à Paris, 1945, p. 21 sq. 
145 Most advanced along the transition to modern economic growth (Kuznets, 1974): i.e. considering relative 
living standards, rates of economic growth, rates of urbanization, transition from agriculture to industry and 
service, transition from a religious to a secular society, openness to international markets. 
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the most developed, or most dynamic European economies of the time. Some of them were 
growing from a low starting point (Russia); others declining or stagnating in relative terms 
(Spain, Portugal, Naples, Sicily and, in a way, also Sweden).  
 
 
Table 3. Percentage of new joint-stock schemes related to long-distance/colonial trade 
Sicily  100% 
Sweden 100% 
Portugal 100% 
Naples 100% 
Emden 100% 
Spain 92% 
Austrian Netherlands 76% 
Russia 75% 
Denmark 66% 
Austria 50% 
France 30% 
England  10% 
United Provinces 2.5% 
Sources: see text.  
 
My thesis is that these schemes highlight a two-speed Europe. Roughly speaking, with 
the marine insurance firms some of the most sophisticated economies were moving to a new 
stage of development; at the same time, less advanced economies were trying to catch up 
with a model that was already more than one century old, namely the privileged join-stock 
company for overseas trading and colonization. The model had spread to Portugal and 
Sweden in the seventeenth century, but the colonial companies created there had 
foundered;146 in Spain, Sicily, Naples, and Russia, no joint-stock enterprise had yet been 
founded.147 Other countries – England in particular – promoted new colonial enterprises in 
1720. The peculiarity of Portugal, Spain, Naples, etc. was that long-distance commerce was 
the unique (or almost unique) focus: neither foreigners, nor local projectors seem to have 
envisioned scope for the joint-stock form outside of it. 
                                                
146 The Portuguese crown had granted a charter to an India Company (1628) and a Brazil Company (1649); 
the Swedish crown to a West India Company (1637) and an African Company (1649). 
147 The Honduras Company founded in Spain in 1714 was more a partnership than a real joint-stock 
company: Delgado Barrado, Fomento portuario y compañías, 1998, p. 102. 
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The Austrian Netherlands and Emden stood in an in-between position. Concerning 
marine insurance they belonged to the advanced group; regarding the share of overseas and 
colonial projects they were close to the least developed countries. The causes of this peculiar 
situation were chiefly political. Philip II of Spain (1598) and then the treaty of Münster 
(1648) had prevented the Belgians from fully participating in the Indies trade.148 As a 
consequence, there was a powerful drive in Antwerp and Ostend to catch up with colonial 
ventures. Likewise, the Dutch Republic – that dominated Emden during the seventeenth 
century –149 had thwarted all attempts there to form an East India Company. 
 
 
The timeline of the equity boom and its meaning 
One of the most striking and unexpected findings of this research is related to the timeline 
of the global equity boom. We already knew that the French, English, and Dutch bubbles 
were connected but not synchronous: the Mississippi Bubble reached its peak first (January 
1720), followed by the South Sea Bubble (July 1720) and by the bulk of the Windhandel 
(September 1720). It is compelling to find that the crash of the Paris, London and 
Amsterdam equity markets did not discourage projectors and investors elsewhere. In the 
three months following the Amsterdam collapse, at least fifteen new companies were 
promoted or chartered (in the Austrian Netherlands, Denmark, Emden, Hanover, 
Palatinate, Papal States, Portugal, Russia, Spain) and three companies were effectively 
floated (in Emden, Hanover, Lorraine).150  
What is more, two of these IPOs each gave rise to a market boom. Fuelled by strong 
inflows of foreign capital, the shares of the Lorraine Company surged by 40% in a few days; 
they reached their peak the 14 November 1720, and were still 20% above par at the end of 
December 1720; they did not fall under par until the end of 1721.151 The stock of the 
Hanover firm was not massively traded, yet many British speculators (including Case 
Billinglsey, the projector of the Royal Exchange Assurance) bought it, and there is evidence 
that its price surged by more than 500%, from £15 to £80. 152  
                                                
148 Huisman, La Belgique, cit., p. 10-12; Van Langendonck ‘Le mouvement colonial’ 1923. 
149 Gosling, Slingelandt’s Efforts Towards European Peace, 1915, I, p. 146. 
150 See Apendix. 
151 For the sstock prices of the Lorraine Company: Gazette d’Amsterdam, 25 October, 12 and 15 November, 31 
December 1720; Journal historique, May 1721, December 1721. 
152 Barrington, The Lord Viscount Barrington’s case, 1722, p. 20; Cummings, ‘The Harburgh Company’, cit., 
p. 7. 
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Perhaps even more strikingly, some Dutch companies bubbled in October-November 
1720. The Dordrecht Company was at its apex the 7 October; Middelburg Commerce (the 
second best performing 1720 Dutch stock after the West India Company) the 26 October; 
Middelburg Insurance the 4 November.153 To put these bubbles into perspective, the West 
India Company had reached its peak the 28 August; the 7 October its share had already 
lost 65%, the 26 October it was down 83%. 
Gelderblom and Jonker (2010, p. 15-17) argue that this later Dutch equity boom looks 
suspicious as the Leydse courant (the primary source for Dutch stock quotes) probably 
reported fabricated prices in the autumn of 1720, i.e. prices planted by brokers and 
promoters in order to canvass support for their subscriptions. There is strong evidence, 
however, that it was far from easy to manipulate the Dutch press. In the same months, John 
Law and the French government had tried to do exactly that; they used every possible 
method – including corruption, physical threats to the editors and their families, indirect 
political pressure both at the municipal and national level – but they failed. 154 
Contemporary Dutch (and English) newspapers had their own ways to preserve their 
freedom.  
Moreover, supposing that some influential promoters had succeeded in planting 
information, it seems quite difficult that they would have succeeded in doing so week after 
week. Yet, the Middelburg Commerce stock price stayed at the top for twenty days (7-26 
October), with some occasional downward fluctuation; the Middelburg Insurance stock 
oscillated above 2,000 guilders for more than one and a half months (7 October-23 
November); the Dordrecht Company share stayed above 400 guilders for over two months 
(30 September-2 November).155  
Besides, the second Dutch boom is consistent with the diachronic character of equity 
markets all over Europe. By diachronic, I mean stocks following a similar pattern but with a 
time lag. In England, the marine insurance firms reached their peak (25 August 1720) 
almost two months after the South Sea Company and most other stocks had started their 
descent.156 Likewise, in Paris the Provence Canal firm boomed (+40% above par) at the 
end of May 1720, in the same days when the Mississippi Company was crashing.157  
The stream of new schemes gradually declined, but did not dry up with the end of 1720. 
Seventeen companies were promoted or chartered in 1721 (in Belgium, Brunswick, 
                                                
153 FGR 1720 price database. 
154 Condorelli, ‘La presse étrangère et le Système de Law’, forthcoming. 
155 FGR 1720 price database. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid.; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 28 May 1720. 
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Denmark, Hanover, Hesse, Naples, Piedmont-Sardinia, Portugal, Russia, Sicily, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland).158 The question here is to what extent these 1721 projects and firms 
belong to the same wave of euphoria that began with the Mississippi and South Sea 
Bubbles. Where shall we set the time limit of the pan-European stock boom?  
I would argue that the boom and the subsequent crisis lasted as long as the 
contemporaries perceived them as a present reality, as long as it was not yet history for 
them. In Britain, the political and social crisis triggered by the collapse of the South Sea 
scheme was not over before the end of 1721. A research in the Burney Collection of 
historical newspapers shows that the recurrence of the word ‘bubble’ declined significantly 
only after October 1721. In France, those (including many international investors) accused 
of having earned too much during the Mississippi Bubble had to wait September 1722 to 
know how much they would be fined; the final liquidation of Law’s System was completed 
only in October 1722. Needless to say, the European press covered the long liquidation 
process till the very end.159 Considering all these elements, and many others, I would 
choose the end of 1722 as the time limit. Therefore, I would consider that the joint-stock 
firm promoted in Bologna in September 1722 still belongs to the scope of this research.160  
In summary, the 1719-20 stock euphoria may be divided in two main periods: a) a 
central phase (summer 1719-summer 1720) that started with the Mississippi Bubble and 
lasted till the collapse of the first Windhandel; b) a long coda (autumn 1720-autumn 1722) 
which started with the Lorraine and Hanover bubbles and lasted till the final liquidation of 
the Mississippi Bubble. Three hundred schemes were promoted during the first period 
versus thirty-six in the second phase. 
The diachronic character of the 1719-22 boom contrasts with what usually happens in 
today’s financial markets, especially in time of turmoil. It would be difficult to imagine, for 
example, a stock market bubble inflating in Britain one month after a brutal crash in the 
United States and the Eurozone. Even harder to imagine a string of emerging markets 
booming and crashing shorty one after the other (research has shown that these tend to 
have the highest price synchronicity during financial crisis).161 How can we explain that 
1720 markets behaved in quite a different way? 
                                                
158 See appendix. 
159 E.g. Daily Courant, 15 October 1722; Daily Post, 15 October 1722; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 23, 27, 30 October 
1722; Gazzetta di Bologna, 22 and 27 October 1722. 
160 See Appendix. 
161 Forbes, Rigobon et al. ‘Contagion in Latin America’, 2001; Khandaker and Heaney ‘Do Emerging 
Markets Have Higher Stock Synchronicity?’, 2009; Khandaker and Islam, ‘Volatility and co-movement’, 
2015. 
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We can start by saying that diachroneity was not the result of lack of information, or lack 
of economic and financial integration. There is countless evidence that all over Europe 
investors and businessmen, together with the general public, were quite well informed 
about what was going on in the most active stock markets. The Gaceta de Madrid, the Gazeta 
de Lisboa, the Corriere di Vienna, the Avvisi di Napoli, or the Gazzetta di Bologna, to take these 
examples, regularly gave news and share prices about the Paris, London, Amsterdam, and 
Hamburg markets.162 In Germany, besides the press, the public was informed by a number 
of pamphlets and books (including a German translation of John Law’s Money and Trade 
Considered).163 Moreover, many new ventures attracted speculators that had already and 
directly experienced market crashes elsewhere. All the promoters of the Lorraine schemes 
were Parisian financiers, and it is highly probable that the Jewish bankers from Lorraine 
that had intensely participated in the Mississippi Bubble also took part in their home 
bubble.164 James Edward Oglethorpe, who came to Lisbon in October 1720 to ‘try his 
fortune’ (see supra), belonged to a family closely connected to John Law, and had been an 
active investor in the French Indies Company.165 Stephen Ram, the main British promoter 
behind the Brunswick scheme (summer 1720), had previously been one of the key actors in 
the London Assurance’s IPO.166 
My hypothesis is that contemporaries simply did not expect that a market downturn 
somewhere should necessarily generate a contagion effect. Therefore, contrarily to what 
would often happen nowadays, there were no self-fulfilling anticipations leading to a 
synchronous financial crash. Contagion did occur – especially between the English and 
Dutch equity markets – but it likely followed other channels, in particular financial 
distress.167 Contemporaries were aware that the wave of speculation was becoming a 
European phenomenon,168 yet they tended nonetheless to see each national boom as a 
                                                
162 E.g. Gaceta de Madrid, 8 August, 12 and 26 September, 28 November 1719, 13 January, 23 April, 13 
August, 10 September 1720; Gazeta de Lisboa, 11 April, 6 and 13 June, 11 and 25 July, 8, 15, 22 and 29 
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2, 6, 9, 13, 16, 20, 23, 27, 30 November 1720; Avvisi di Napoli, 23 January 1720; Gazzetta di Bologna, 7 May 
1720, etc. 
163 Rosenhaft, ‘Tout ce qui brille n’est pas d’or’, forthcoming. 
164 AAE, CP Lorraine 107, c. 19, 224. 
165 BL, Add. ms. 31140, c. 56, 58, 62, 76, 80. 
166 Drew, The London Assurance, cit., p. 6-8; The Case of great numbers, cit. 
167 Investors having bought stocks on margin being forced to sell other assets in order to raise cash: Frehen et 
al., ‘New evidence’, p. 594. 
168 See for instance the extracts from the Lettres Historiques below. A contemporary pamphlet, The Dutch 
Bubblers, declared: ‘The Dutch […] are grown as foolish […] as any neighbouring nation: they coppy England 
and France in vile destructive bubbles’.  
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somewhat special case. This perspective appears clearly in this extract where an Amsterdam 
periodical commented on the flotation of the Imperial Company in September 1720: 
 
As there is every appearance that absolute power [of the government] or vested interests will 
not have as much influence on this company as they have on other companies that have been 
erected in several other European countries, we can hope that it will not face the same troubles 
[…].169 
 
Three months later, the same periodical made similar observations about a scheme for a 
corporation in Lisbon: 
 
It seemed that the king [of Portugal] had abandoned the project of erecting a trading company 
in imitation of the French and English ones. But they assure that His Majesty wants to enact it 
now, and that they have found effective ways to preserve this company from the difficulties 
where the others have fallen.170  
 
Again, in January 1721, the same paper explained that the joint-stock company projected 
in Ostend should supposedly become ‘the best of Europe, by the measures [the projectors] 
were taking to ensure its credit’.171 However, this time the journal added a note of 
skepticism: ‘should we dare, it asked, to trust [this new undertaking] after what has 
happened in France and in the neighboring countries?’ The public in general, and investors 
in particular, had clearly learned a number of lessons about stock markets in the previous 
months, and the general exuberance was waning. In March 1721, when the Brunswick 
Bank was about to be floated, another gazette explained to its readers that ‘the bad results 
that other similar enterprises have experienced elsewhere does not give much emulation to 
the new shareholders in Brunswick’.172 
Needless to say, many market observers had not waited 1721 to question the 
sustainability of the consecutive equity booms. According to a French diplomat in 
Hamburg (25 August 1720) ‘the most informed merchants’ of the city were convinced that 
the English shares would plunge within a few months, and that the ‘contagious disease’ of 
stock trading would soon take over Holland.173 In October 1720, the same Amsterdam 
                                                
169 Lettres Historiques, October 1720 p. 428-429. Italics added. 
170 Ibid., December 1720 p. 731. Italics added. 
171 Ibid., January 1721, p. 113. 
172 Journal historique, March 1721 p. 207.  
173 AAE, CP Hambourg 48, p. 214. 
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periodical that had expressed one month earlier some optimism about the prospects of the 
Imperial Company was less sanguine about the Venetian IPO:  
 
It would be curious, it noted, in the present conjuncture of so many companies established in 
other European countries, that the Republic of Venice would be able to foresee and avoid the 
inconveniences that have caused elsewhere so many prejudices to the civil society.174 
 
Still, even if the consecutive equity booms happened to be unsustainable, contemporaries 
saw that there was a profitable – albeit difficult – game that could be played, namely riding 
one bubble after the other. A great number of documents show that this jumping game 
became a general theme in the press and the business letters – although it is not clear how 
many investors actually managed to play it. For instance, a Parisian report published by the 
Daily Post (22 March 1720) noted that the local stockjobbers were ‘very much discouraged’, 
that they expected ‘that before a year is at end, the affair of the Mississippi will sink very 
much lower’, and that those who had money were going to London to invest it, anticipating 
that ‘the South Sea Company [was] in a fair way to be as high, in proportion, as [the] 
Mississippi stock has been.’ Early August, a report from London was telling a comparable 
story: 
 
Many of our stockjobbers have gone to Holland in order to be the first to subscribe in the 
schemes they are promoting there to pay off the debts of the Republic; and many persons of 
quality, and others, that have made big profits with the South Sea Company, have also sent 
orders to their agents or friends in Holland to subscribe to those new companies.175  
 
There is evidence that investors were effectively trying to do that, and that they were often 
experiencing the typical difficulties inherent in market timing strategies (missing the big 
movements) and in IPOs (getting too few shares). Lord Strafford’s letter book is particularly 
interesting in this respect.  
 
[paragraph about Strafford’s operations here] 
 
As many investors were jumping, or waiting to jump, from bubble to bubble, a feedback 
loop developed. Instead of shortening the sequence and length of the global boom, self-
                                                
174 Lettres Historiques, October 1720 p. 407. 
175 Corriere di Vienna, 3 August 1720.  
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fulfilling anticipations ended up extending it; they generated diachroneity instead of 
synchronicity. A British diplomat in Lisbon clearly describes this feedback process when he 
writes (11 November 1720) that ‘the great sums that have been lately remitted hither from 
England for subscriptions [in a Brazil Company] have been, I believe, the greatest 
incouragement for their [the Portuguese] undertaking it’.176 There is evidence suggesting 
that projectors expected that the floatation of a new firm – at least in certain countries – 
would nearly automatically attract foreign capital. For instance, writing to the king of Spain 
(15 June 1720), a projector assured that if an Indies Company was launched in Cadiz, the 
Dutch would be willing to buy shares for 50 million piasters (~£10.7 million).177 Another 
scheme for a Spanish corporation based its calculations on the assumption that foreign 
investors would certainly be ‘furiously’ interested in its stock.178   
 
 
Experimenting with the join-stock form  
Besides the question of foreign capital, this latter Spanish undertaking is interesting because 
it reiterates a theme that we already briefly mentioned – and that was a topos of the 1720 
joint-stock boom – namely that new companies might do better than previous ones. In this 
specific case, the anonymous projector asserted that the corporation he proposed would 
become ‘more solid, more flourishing and more wealthy than all the others’, not only 
because it would be carefully planned and managed, but also because it would be ‘based on 
a solid and stable foundation’, i.e. ‘the Spanish Indies, the source of all the riches of 
Europe’. This statement was not pure rhetoric. The years 1719-21 were a period of intense 
economic experimentation. For a few months in the fall of 1719, John Law’s System had 
given the impression that financial techniques could totally transform a society for the 
better. The South Sea scheme, as long as it seemed to work well, had also captured the 
imagination of the public in Britain and the rest of Europe. Who could have told then if a 
well-organized Spanish company would not end up transforming the Atlantic world 
together with the European economy? 
The experimentation with the joint-stock form took three main directions. The first one, 
which we have analyzed in detail, was the attempt to import the corporate model – and 
therefore also the stock market – in countries that were not necessarily ready to accept them 
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(an that indeed, in most cases, rejected them). The second direction was about business 
sectors. Contemporaries and following generations have often lampooned the crop of odd 
schemes that were projected in England in 1720, but these were really part of a general idea 
that it was possible to apply the joint-stock form to the whole market economy: from marine 
insurance to agriculture, from consumer goods to the building industry.179 There had never 
been before public companies for constructing houses or ships, for planting madder or 
improving land and gardens in England, for supplying London with meat and fresh fish. To 
my knowledge, joint-stock firms for local or regional trade were also a 1720 novelty. These 
were promoted not only in England, but also all over Europe (in the United Provinces, 
Austrian Netherlands, Switzerland, Geneva, France, Lorraine, Milan, Naples, Papal States, 
Palatinate, Brunswick, Hanover, Hesse). 
The joint-stock form proved to be particularly effective for the constitution of 
conglomerates. John Law opened the way with his gigantic company, a kind of economic 
monster with three heads (tax farming monopoly, overseas trade monopoly, and state 
bank). This model did not appeal to later generations, but it inspired many 1720-21 
projectors (in Britain, Austrian Netherlands, Lorraine, Brunswick, East Frisia, Hesse, 
Hanover, Spain, Piedmont, Russia). Conglomerates – albeit less mighty – became a kind of 
fashion also in the Dutch Republic: from mid-August 1720 on, new schemes there 
embraced at least four or five different industries (insurance, manufacturing, shipping, 
infrastructure, river tolls, trade, etc.)180 
The third direction of experimentation had to do with the problem of the secondary 
market. Without entering into the vast issue of how speculation was perceived in early 
modern times, we can simply note that ‘stock jobbing’ (as contemporaries called it) was 
generally considered a shameful activity. Johnson’ Dictionary of the English Language (1755) 
defined a stock-jobber as ‘a low wretch who gets money by buying and selling shares in the 
funds.’ Respectable people, and in particular aristocrats, could invest in shares almost all 
over Europe, but they could not speculate – at least in theory – without losing their honor 
and rank.181 So one of the financial problems that contemporaries tried to solve was how to 
get the economic advantages of the joint-stock form without the nuisance (as they perceived 
it) of a speculative secondary market for stocks. Projectors, together with governments and 
parliaments, tried to devise mechanisms to tame speculation. The Spanish scheme 
                                                
179 Anderson, An historical and chronological deduction, cit., provides the most complete list of 1720 English 
projects. 
180 Gelderblom and Jonker, ‘Mirroring’, cit., Table 1. 
181 On this subject: Yamamoto, ‘The speculation that dared not speak its name’, paper presented at the 
WEHC 2015. 
  40 
mentioned above proposed that transfers of shares should only be made through public 
notaries.182 Although we don’t have all the details of the Swiss project (June 1721), there is 
evidence that it was focused on limiting share trading.183 In Ireland, while it was debating 
about a charter for a bank, and in order ‘to prevent stock jobbing’, the parliament 
considered forbidding transfers of stocks not registered in the company’s book.184  
Other experiments aimed at improving corporate governance, or finding best ways to 
protect the firms from arbitrary state interventionism – especially in countries with absolute 
monarchies. Contemporaries clearly thought it was possible to learn from ‘other’s errors’ (as 
a Dutch periodical put it)185 in order to create a corporation that might be immune from 
the problems – in particular a stock market crash – experienced by previous joint-stock 
companies. Like cooks or alchemists, projectors and rulers were trying to find the right 
recipe for a superior form of enterprise. The parallel with alchemy is not so far fetched. 
Alchemical theories strongly influenced the political economy and the financial ideas of the 
time.186 It is also telling that many pamphlets, caricatures, songs, and poems about the 1720 
bubble referred to the theme of alchemy, thus highlighting that they were somehow 
connected in the mind of the public.187 
 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the paper has three main findings: a) The number of countries involved in the 
1719-22 joint-stock boom was much greater than previously thought; the stock euphoria 
spread across the continent, demonstrating that European financial markets were largely 
driven by common forces. b) All over Europe this was a period of intense experimentation 
with the joint-stock form; yet, the same kind of undertakings were not promoted 
everywhere: the most advanced economies focused, in particular, on marine insurance, 
whereas the least developed attempted to catch up with the model of the privileged 
company for overseas trading and colonization.  c) Contrarily to what would generally 
happen today, self-fulfilling anticipations of market participants generated diachroneity (co-
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movement with a time lag) instead of synchronicity, and thus extended the sequence and 
length of the global bubble. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. The joint-stock boom (December 1718-October 1722) 
 
The size of each circle represents the number of undertakings projected in that country. Orange circles 
indicate the countries where at least one scheme gave rise to some form of intense speculation and market 
boom (group 1 in Table 1). Blue circles symbolize the countries where the schemes did not generate any 
significant boom (groups 2 and 3 in Table 1).  
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Figure 2. Financial markets bubbles (1719-20) 
 
The size of the orange circles represents the strength of each market boom. The ‘bubbles’ are connected 
according to their approximate latitude. 
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Figure 3. Public debt-to-equity swaps (1719-20) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Marine insurance schemes (1720) 
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Figure 5. Share of schemes for long-distance and colonial trade higher than 75% (1719-21) 
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Figure 6. Joint-stock firms floated in Europe (1600-1789). Stacked graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Cumulative number of joint-stock firms floated in Europe (1600-1789). Stacked graph 
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Figure 8. Cadiz and Lisbon exchange rates on Amsterdam (Nov. 1719-Dec. 1720) 
Source: FGR 1720 price database.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Cadiz and Lisbon exchange rates on London (March-Dec. 1720) 
Source: FGR 1720 price database. 
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Appendix I. Schemes for new joint-stock firms in the periphery (1719-22) 
 
 
SYMBOLS 
* Companies publicly floated (whether successfully or not). 
© Companies that commenced business. 
 
 
FL: florins from Brabant 
ML: marks lub 
P: pieces of eight 
RT: reichsthalers 
 
 
 
Austria 
1. *Imperial Privileged Oriental Company©1  
Charter (May 1719), IPO in Vienna (September 1720) for one million RT (~£225,000). 
Promoted by the emperor, directed by state officials. 
Long-distance trade (Levant), manufacturing. Monopoly rights. 
 
2. Insurance Bank2 
Project (1720).  Capital: 373,000 RT (~£84,000). 
Italian speaking promoter. 
Banking. 
 
 
                                                
1 Amsterdamse courant, 1st October 1720; Corriere di Vienna, 28 September, 18 December 1720, 30 April, 7 June, 
20 August, 3 and 20 September 1721; Daily Courant, 26 December 1719, 29 April 1720; Daily Journal, 7 June 
1721; Daily Post, 28 December 1719, 4 October 1720; Europäische Fama, June 1720 p. 456; Gazeta de Lisboa, 31 
October 1720, 26 June 1721; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 4, 8 October 1720, 20 and 27 May 1721; Gazzetta di Bologna, 
8 October 1720; La Gazette, 19 October 1720, 31 May 1721; Haerlemsche courant, 1st October, 31 December 
1720, 13 May 1721; Lettres historiques, October 1720 p. 428, January 1721 p. 114; Mercure historique, Septembre 
1720 p. 359, October 1720 p. 403; Post Boy, 27 July 1721. Huisman (1902), Dickson (1967), Roider (1994), 
Ingrao (2000). 
2 OEStA, FHKA SUS NL Schirndorf 12, ‘Progetto d’un banco d’assicurazione’.  
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Austrian Netherlands 
1. Bengal Company3 
Project (1717-1720). 
Promoted by Francesco della Pietà (an Augustinian monk, of Italian origins, based in Bengal); 
discussed in official circles. 
Long-distance trade (Asia). 
 
2. *Ostend East India Company©4 
Projects (1719-1721), charter (December 1722), IPO in Antwerp (August 1723). Capital: 6 million 
FL (~£0.56 million). 
Promoted by Ostend and Antwerp merchants, the states of Flanders, the city of Antwerp, with the 
fluctuating support of the emperor and prince Eugene (Austrian Netherlands’ governor). 
Long-distance trade (Arabia, Asia, China). In the 1719 plan, trade with the Americas was also 
considered.5 Monopoly rights. 
 
3. Privileged Imperial Company of India and Levant6 
Project (October 1719). Capital: 50 million FL (~£4.7 million). 
Promoted by two French businessmen, Marsaut and Du Péray; discussed in official circles. 
Long-distance trade (Levant, Asia), manufacturing. Monopoly rights.  
 
                                                
3 OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 9, 28 August 1720, 10 January 1720 (from Bengal). 
4 AAE, CP Pays-Bas Autrichiens 80, c. 203; HaNA, Raadpensionaris Van Hoornbeek, 3.01.20, inv. 367; 
OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 10, c. 353; Berichte 11, c. 309 (I am grateful to Larry Neal for 
giving me the transcription of these documents from the Austrian archives). Amsterdamsche Argus, July 1720 (n. 
7), August 1721 (n. 12); Applebee Journal, 30 July 1720; Avvisi di Napoli, 23 April 1720; Daily Journal, 10 July 
1721; Daily Post, 19 October 1719, 2, 27 and 30 June, 6 July, 9 September 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 10 
September 1720, 3 January 1721; Europäische Fama, 1721 p. 84; Gazeta de Lisboa, 17 July, 7 and 14 August 
1721; Gazette de Leyde, 3 January, 27 May, 15 July, 5 September, 19 December 1721; Haerlemsche courant, 12 
September 1720; La Gazette, 12 July 1721, 21 June 1721, 27 September, 29 November 1721; Lettres historiques, 
January 1721 p. 113-114, February 1721 p. 232, June 1721 p. 708, July 1721 p. 111; Post Man, 18 July 1721; 
Saturday’s Post, 10 September 1720; Weekly Packet, 3 and 17 June 1721. Harris (1744), vol. I, XXXVI; Huisman 
(1902). 
5 La Gazette, 2 December 1719. The very first project for an Ostend Company (1714), drafted by the 
Scotsman John Ker, also embraced trade with America: Ker (1726).  
6 NWR, Gesamtarchiv von Landsberg-Velen, 34842, 34857; OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 9, 
7 December 1720; Belgien 136A report DD Abteilung B, 8 and 29 March 1720. Huisman (1902). 
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4. Imperial Bank and Privileged India trading Company7 
Project (spring-summer 1720). Capital: 12 million FL (~£1.12 million). The company should have 
been floated in London. 
Promoted by Du Péray (see above); discussed in official circles. 
Banking, introducing paper money, intra-European trade, long-distance trade (Asia), slave trade, 
fisheries, manufacturing. Monopoly rights. Debt-for-equity swap. Model: John Law’s System. 
 
5. State Bank8  
Project (March 1720). Capital: 10-12 million FL (~£0.94-1.12 million) 
Promoted by the marquis de Prié (Austrian Netherlands’ deputy-governor); discussed in official 
circles. 
Banking. Debt-for-equity swap. Model: Bank of Saint George, John Law’s System. 
 
6. East India and general trade Company9  
Project (spring-summer 1720). Capital: 60 million FL (~£5.6 million). 
Unknown promoter. 
Intra-European trade, long-distance trade (Asia). Monopoly rights (presumably). 
 
7. Trading company10 
Project (April 1720).  
Projected by a merchant from Bruges, Houwens des Gardrins; discussed in official circles. 
Intra-European trade (between Flanders and the empire). 
 
8. Levant and East India Company11 
Project (May 1720); discussed in official circles. 
Promoted by an Antwerp-based banker, the baron de Cloots. 
Long-distance trade (Levant, Arabia, Asia). 
 
9. Privileged trading Company12 
Project (likely summer 1720). Capital: 10 million FL (~£0.94 million). 
                                                
7 NWR, Gesamtarchiv von Landsberg-Velen, 34841; OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 9, 20 
August 1720. Huisman (1902). 
8 Huisman (1902). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien 136A report DD Abteilung B, 10 May 1720. 
12 Huisman (1902). 
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Promoted by the Italian banker (established in Antwerp) Proli and the Belgian tax farmer Sotelet. 
Long-distance trade (Asia). 
 
10. East India Company13  
Project (July 1720). The capital should have been large. 
Promoted by a syndicate of English businessmen (that proposed to invest ‘large sums’); discussed in 
official circles. 
Long-distance trade (Asia). 
 
11. Marine Insurance Company14  
Project (July 1720-February 1721). Capital: £2 million. 
Likely promoted by another syndicate of English businessmen; discussed in official circles. 
Marine insurance, banking, introducing paper-currency. Monopoly rights. 
 
12. East India Company15 
Project (summer 1720-spring 1721). Capital: 12 million FL (~£1.12 million). 
Promoted by the Scottish projector John Ker (who had been the first, in 1714, to propose a scheme 
for an Ostend Company); discussed in official circles. 
Long-distance trade (Asia and America), colonization of Tobago, banking, insurance (likely marine), 
fisheries, manufacturing. 
 
13. East India and China Company16 
Project (August-October 1720). 
Promoted by the Maelcamp brothers from Gand; discussed in official circles. 
Long-distance trade (Asia and China). Monopoly rights. 
 
14. Shipping on the Gete and Demer rivers17 
Project (August 1720). 
                                                
13 OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 9, 20 August 1720. It is likely that Applebee Journal, 23 July 
1720 mentions Ker’s scheme. Ker (1726), p. 164. Huisman (1902). 
14 OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 9, 30 July, 20 August 1720. Ker (1726), p. 164. Huisman 
(1902). 
15 Ker (1726), p. 164-172. Huisman (1902). 
16 Huisman (1902). 
17 OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 9, 23 April 1720. Avvisi di Napoli, 17 September 1720; Daily 
Post, 18 May 1720; Post Boy, 31 May 1720. Huisman (1902). 
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Promoted by a syndicate of businessmen from Liège led by one Massillon; Houwens des Gardrins, 
see above, was their agent in Vienna; discussed in official circles. 
Intra-European trade, river infrastructure. 
 
15. Imperial Company of the German merchants trading in East and West India, Africa, Guinea, 
China, Japan and South Sea18 
Project (October 1720-August 1721).  
Promoted by the marquis Del Campo, governor of Ostend; discussed in official circles. 
Long-distance trade (Asia, China, Africa, America, Pacific), slave trade (presumably). Monopoly 
rights. Model: Dutch East India Company. 
 
16. Trading Company19 
Project (November 1720-March 1721).  
Promoted by Bauwens (Ostend burgomaster); discussed in official circles. 
Long-distance trade (America), colonization in America. Monopoly rights. Model: Dutch East India 
Company. 
 
17. East India Company20 
Project (summer-autumn 1721). Capital: 10 million FL (~£0.94 million). 
Promoted by John Colebrooke (an English speculator, connected to John Law); discussed in official 
circles. 
Long-distance trade (Asia). 
 
Brunswick 
1. Trading and manufacturing company©21 
Project (1718), charter (June 1720).  
Promoted by Johan Gerhard Hopmann, the duke of Brunswick, and a syndicate of British investors. 
Intra-European trade, manufacturing. Monopoly rights. 
 
                                                
18 OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 9, 7 December 1720; Belgien 136A report DD Abteilung B, 
7 October 1720. Huisman (1902). 
19 OeStA, HHStA LA Belgien DD-A Berichte 9, 7 December 1720. Huisman (1902). 
20 NWR, Gesamtarchiv von Landsberg-Velen, 34849, 34855. Evening Post, 26 October 1721; Gazette de Leyde, 
29 July, 12 August, 5 September 1721; Ker (1726), p. 173-178. 
21 NSAW, 2 old n. 6542, c. 29-62 (I am grateful to Tina Asmussen for the transcription of these documents, 
and to Eve Rosenhaft for giving me her notes from these archives); NSAW, 4 old 5 n. 358. 
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2. Bank of Brunswick22 
Project (June 1720).  
Promoted by a group of English investors, with the support of the duke of Brunswick. 
Banking, lottery (only those who had bought tickets in the Brunswick’s lottery would have been 
admitted in the IPO).23 Model: Bank of England. 
 
3. Bank and trading company24 
Project (early 1721), charter (June 1721). 
Promoted by a syndicate of British investors, with the support of the duke of Brunswick. 
Banking, lottery, intra-European trade. 
 
Denmark 
1. West & East India and Guinea Company25 
Project (late August 1720). Capital: 1.75 million ML (~£0.131 million). 
Promoted by a ‘foreigner of distinction’; discussed in official circles. 
Long-distance trade (America, Asia, Africa), slave trade (presumably). 
 
2. Insurance Company26 
Project (July-October 1720).  
Promoted by Hamburg businessmen. 
Insurance. 
 
3. Bergen Greenland Company©27 
Project (1718), charter (1721).  
Promoted by the Lutheran minister Hans Egede; supported by the crown. The initial project was 
for a joint-stock company, but it became a partnership. 
                                                
22 NSAW, 2 old n. 6543, cc. 6-41. Gazette d’Amsterdam, 30 August 1720, 24 January 1721; Mercure historique, 
September 1720 p. 275. The Case of great (1720). 
23 The Brunswick lottery was advertised in the English press: e.g. Daily Courant, 19, 21, 27 January 1720, etc. 
24 NSAW, 4 old 5 n. 358. Gazette d’Amsterdam, 3 January 1721; Journal historique, March 1721 p. 207; Lettres 
historiques, February 1721 p. 172. 
25 Amsterdamsche courant, 5 October 1720; Daily Courant, 3 November 1720; Daily Post, 23 July 1720; Evening 
Post, 29 September 1720; Gazeta de Lisboa, 28 November 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 1 October 1720; Gazette de 
Leyde, 8 October 1720; Haerlemsche courant, 5 October 1720; Lettres historiques, October 1720 p. 417; Post Boy, 27 
October 1720. 
26 Daily Post, 23 July 1720; Corriere di Vienna, 19 October 1720; Mercure historique, October 1720 p. 397. 
27 Savary des Brûlons (1765), p. 736. Oswalt (1999); Marquardt (2006). 
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Colonizing Greenland, mining, fisheries, long-distance trade (Greenland). Sought monopoly rights. 
Note: the enterprise undertook the exploration and colonization of Greenland, but as a private 
company. It went bankrupt in 1727. 
 
East Frisia 
1. *Emden Company©28 
Project (September 1720), IPO (October 1720). 
Supported by the municipality. 
Long-distance trade (Asia), intra-European trade, fisheries, marine insurance, manufacturing. 
Note: the enterprise was active in 1721, at least in the regional trade and insurance business. 
 
Geneva 
1. Manufacturing and trading Company29 
Project (early 1720). 
Promoted by local businessmen.  
Regional trade, manufacturing.  
 
Hanover 
1. Hanover Linen Company30 
Project (September 1719). Capital: 1.2 million RT (~£270,000). 
Proposed by Johann Friedrich von Eckhart, a banker from Hanover.31 
Manufacturing. 
 
                                                
28 Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv, Aurich, Rep. 4, BIVe, 179, c. 53 sq. (I am grateful to Daniel Menning for 
giving me the photos of this document). Europische mercurius, September 1720 p. 200; Haerlemsche courant, 5 and 
29 October, 26 November 1720; Lettres historiques, January 1721 p. 119. Het groote Tafereel (1720), ‘De 
Windhandel of bubbels compagnien’, p. 30. 
29 Archives d’État de Genève, Chambre de Commerce, III, c. 262; Sayous (1937). 
30 Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv, Hanover, HA Hanover 93, 1437. I am grateful to Daniel Menning for 
giving me the photos of this document. 
31 On J. F. von Eckhart: Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover, Veröffentlichungen des Leibniz-
Archivs, In Bearbeitung befindliche Bände, Reihe I, 25, n. 123, a letter of Otto Mencke to Leibniz (November 
1705). 
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2. *Harburgh Company©32 
Project (1716), charter (October 1720). IPO in Hanover (late 1720). Capital: £500,000. 
Promoted by J. C. Nicolai, R. Baylis, Sir J. Eyles, C. Billingsley, W. Squire and other London 
businessmen; supported by the elector of Hanover (i.e. the king of Britain). 
Intra-European trade, banking, lottery, fisheries, river and port infrastructure. 
Note: there is evidence that the stock was traded; some work was also started on port infrastructure 
in Harburgh. The firm sought a British charter, but failed to get it.33 
 
3. *Harburgh manufacturing Company34 
Charter (October 1720), IPO in Hanover (late 1720). Capital: £540,800. 
Promoted by lord Barrington and other London businessmen; supported by the elector of Hanover. 
Manufacturing. 
Note: there is evidence that the shares raised from £15 to £80.35  
 
4. *United Harburgh Company©36 
Merger of the above two corporations (Hanover charter in 1721). Capital: £1,5 million. 
Promoted by lord Barrington, B. Joules, C. Billingsley, and other London businessmen; supported 
by the elector of Hanover. 
Lottery, intra-European trade, manufacturing. 
Note: the firm organized a lottery in England as a way to raise capital (November 1722); the House 
of Commons stopped the lottery, and the whole enterprise faltered in 1723. 
 
Hesse-Kassel 
1. *Kassel Kommerzbank©37 
Charter (April 1721), IPO in Kassel (probably summer 1721) Capital: 500,000 guilder (~£84,000) 
Promoted by the landgrave of Hesse. 
Intra-European trading, banking, manufacturing. Monopoly rights. 
                                                
32 London Journal, 22 October 1720. Barrington (1722). Cummings (1986). 
33 British Gazetteer, 23 July 1720. 
34 Journal of the House of Commons, vol. 20, p. 119-120. Amsterdamse courant, 19 October 1720. Barrington (1722). 
Cummings (1986). 
35 Barrington (1722), p. 20; Cummings (1986), p. 7. 
36 Daily Courant, 7 and 30 November 1722; London Journal, 29 December 1722; Saturday’s Post, 3 November 
1722, 2 March 1723. Journal of the House of Commons, vol. 20, p. 115-125. Historical register, 1723, XXIX, p. 116-
135. Barrington (1722); Cummings (1986). 
37 Europäische Fama, 1721 p. 667; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 16 May 1721; Lettres historiques, May 1721 p. 543; Mercure 
historique, June 1721 p. 734. Roth (1858) vol. I, p. 288; Baer (1907), p. 27. 
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Note: the firm was active until de mid-nineteenth century. 
 
Lorraine 
1. *Trading and Finance Company©38 
Project (January 1720), charter (August 1720), IPO in Nancy (November 1720). Capital: 3 million 
livres of Lorraine (~£225,000). 
Jointly promoted by French projectors and the duke of Lorraine. 
Intra-European trade, banking, tax farming, manufacturing, mining, canal (project to join the 
Saône to the Meuse). Monopoly rights. Debt-for-equity swap. Model: John Law’s System. 
Note: the IPO was a success: fuelled by strong inflows of foreign capital, shares surged by 40% in a 
few days. Moreover, the Lorraine stock did not immediately collapse after its peak (14 November): it 
was still at 20% above par mid-December, and it did not fall under par until the end of 1721.39 The 
enterprise was active until March 1722, when the duke liquidated it.40  
 
2. Trading Company (second project)41 
Project (January 1720). 
French promoter; discussed in official circles. 
Intra-European trade, banking, manufacturing? 
Note: from the report sent by a French diplomat in Nancy, it is clear that there were at least three 
French schemes for a Lorraine Company – and possibly more.  
 
3. Trading Company (third project)42  
Project (January 1720). 
French promoter; discussed in official circles. 
Intra-European trade, banking, manufacturing? 
 
                                                
38 AAE, CP Lorraine 107, c. 19, 182, 190, 211, 224. Daily Post, 19 September, 20 October 1720; Corriere di 
Vienna, 12 October 1720; Gazeta de Lisboa, 7 November 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 24 September, 1st and 22 
October, 22 November 1720, 7 and 24 January 1721; Lettres historiques, September 1720 p. 345, October 1720 
p. 603, January 1721 p. 90, September 1721 p. 323; Mercure historique, November 1720 p. 563; Post Boy, 17 
September 1720. Recueil des edits (1733). 
39 For the prices of the Lorraine Company see: AAE, CP Lorraine 107, c. 211; Gazeta de Lisboa, 30 January, 
24 April 1721; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 25 October, 12 and 15 November, 31 December 1720; Journal historique, 
May 1721, December 1721. 
40 Durival (1774), p. 234. 
41 AAE, CP Lorraine 107, c. 19. 
42 Ibid. 
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Milan 
1. *Casa di San Giuseppe©43 
Project (January 1720), IPO in Milan (1720). Capital: 4 million lire (~£171,000). 
Promoted by Giuseppe Ronzio and the count Borromeo Arese; supported by the state. 
Intra-European trade, manufacturing, canal (from Milan to the Pò). Monopoly rights. 
Note: the company was floated but there is no evidence that its shares were actively traded; it began 
manufacturing, but it encountered fierce opposition from the local guilds, and it closed down 
around 1722. 
 
Naples 
1. Levant and East India Privileged trading Company44 
Project (1720).  
Unknown projector. 
Long-distance trade (Asia through Egypt and the Red Sea), manufacturing. Monopoly rights. 
Model: English and Dutch East India Companies. 
 
2. East & West India, Levant, and Europe trading and shipping Company45 
Project (1720). 
Promoted by a Neapolitan projector, Domenico Rocca. 
Long-distance trade (America, Levant, Asia), intra-European trade, manufacturing. Monopoly 
rights. 
Note: the company was part of a larger plan to connect and develop the economies of the Habsburg 
possessions in Italy (Naples, Sicily, and Milan). 
 
3. Trading Company46 
Project (April 1721).  
                                                
43 Archivio di Stato di Milano, Commercio parte antica, 2, ‘Succinta dimostrazione […] che può tenere la 
Compagnia d’alcuni interessati’. Ronzio (1720). Caizzi (1968). 
44 OeStA/HHStA Italien Spanischer Rat Neapel, Collectanea, 52, 4, ‘Progetto di nuovo commercio delli 
regni di Napoli e Sicilia’. Di Vittorio (1969). I could not find in the Archivio di Stato di Napoli any document 
related to the any of the three Neapolitan schemes. 
45 Di Vittorio (1969).  
46 The original document has been lost since Di Vittorio (1969) studied it. 
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Promoted by Von Fleischmann (the economic adviser to the emperor); discussed among official 
circles. 
Long-distance trade (Levant), intra-European trade, manufacturing, shipping. Monopoly rights. 
 
Palatinate 
1. Mannheim Company47 
Project (November 1720). 
Unknown projectors. 
Intra-European trade. 
 
Papal States 
1. Rome trade and insurance Company48 
Project (September 1720). 
Promoted by local projectors; rejected by the government. 
Insurance, intra-European trade. 
 
2. Bologna trading Company49 
Project (October 1722). Capital: one million lire (~£43,000). 
Promoted by a large group of local businessmen; rejected by the government. 
Manufacturing, intra-European trade, financial services. 
 
Piedmont-Sardinia 
1.  Royal Bank50 
Project (early 1720). 
Unknown French-Speaking projector; discussed among official circles. 
Banking, introducing paper money, state assets management, long-distance trade, manufacturing. 
Debt-for-equity swap. Model: John Law’s System and Venetian Banco Giro. 
                                                
47 Amsterdamse courant, 23 November 1720; Haerlemsche courant, 23 November 1720. 
48  Amsterdamse courant, 26 October, 9 November 1720; Amsterdamsche Argus, November 1720 (n. 24), 
4 December 1720 (n. 26). 
49 Muzzi, Annali della città di Bologna, 1846, vol. 8, p. 397, publishes the full text of the project. 
50 AST, Finanza, I a., Lotterie, etc., M.1 n. 7. Although the scheme does not explicitly mention the creation 
of a corporation, there is little doubt that the projector had that in mind once the crown would have accepted 
his banking scheme. The reference to ‘overseas trade’ is a further confirmation. 
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2.  Deposit Bank and Company of the Seven51 
Project (February 1721). 
Unknown projector; approved by the government (provided some amendments to the scheme).  
Banking, intra-European trade, manufacturing, religious charity. 
Note: in spite of the government’s approval, the scheme did not take off. 
 
3. Turin Deposit and Loan Bank52 
Project (March 1721). Capital: 600,000 doppie piemontesi (~£380,000). 
Promoted by two Turin bankers, Boggetti and Myna; approved by the government (provided some 
amendments to the scheme, including a threefold increase of the projected capital).  
Banking. 
Note: in spite of the government’s approval, the scheme did not take off. 
 
Portugal 
1. Brazil Company (first project)53 
Project (early 1720). 
Promoted by the government. Rejected mostly because of the Inquisition’s opposition. 
Long-distance trade (Brazil). Monopoly rights. Debt-for-equity swap. Model: John Law System. 
Note: count of Ribeira, the Portuguese ambassador in Paris, sent a scheme to Lisbon. The 
government also invited John Lambert (a director of the South Sea Company) to come to Lisbon to 
advise on the project; he declined the invitation. 
 
2. Brazil Company (second project)54  
Project (summer 1720). Capital: £12-13 million (the capital would have been raised in Portuguese 
currency). 
Promoted by the government. Rejected mostly because of the Inquisition’s opposition. 
Long-distance trade (Brazil). Monopoly rights. Debt-for-equity swap. Model: South Sea Company. 
Note: the Portuguese ambassador in London sent the project to Lisbon after several consultations 
with English businessmen, including John Lambert (see above). 
 
                                                
51 AST, Consiglio di Stato, Consiglio di finanze 1721-22, c. 23-24. 
52 AST, Consiglio di Stato, Consiglio di finanze 1721-22, c. 36 and 39. 
53 BL, Add. ms. 31140, c. 17 (quoted by Carswell, 1960); NA, SP 89/28, c. 25, 124. 
54 NA, SP 89/28, c. 101, 124, 128. Gazette d’Amsterdam, 3 September, 25 October 1720. 
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3. Bank & Company for Brazil, Africa and East India (first project)55 
Project (summer-autumn 1720). Capital: £3-4 million (the capital would have been raised in 
Portuguese currency).  
Promoted by London businessmen together with the marquis Abrantes and other Portuguese 
ministers. 
Long-distance trade (Brazil, Africa, Asia), slave trade, banking, tax faming, mining. Monopoly 
rights. 
Note: the company would have lent 5 million cruzados to the crown at 3% interest.56 
 
4. Bank and Company for Brazil, Africa and East India (second project)57 
Project (summer 1720-spring 1721). Capital: 1-2 million moeda (~£1.3-2.6 million). 
Promoted by the count of Ribeira, Portuguese ambassador to France; supported by part of the 
government (opposition of the secretary of state). 
Long-distance trade (Brazil, Africa, Asia), slave trade, banking. Monopoly rights. 
 
5. Angola, Macao, Maranhão Company58 
Project (end 1720-early 1721). Capital: 20-30 million cruzados (~£2.2-3.3 million). 
Projected by local entrepreneurs and ministers; supported by the crown. 
Long-distance trade (Asia, Africa, Atlantic), slave trade. Monopoly rights. 
 
                                                
55 AGS, Estado leg. 7107, Portugal, 20 August, 3 September, 17 September 1720; ASVA, Secreteria di 
Stato, Portogallo 75, c. 426, 431; BL, Add ms. 31140, 3 September 1720; CA, Coutts Letter Book O 14, p. 
329 (I am grateful to Larry Neal for giving me the transcription of this document); NA, SP 89/28, c. 124, 128. 
Applebee’s Journal, 3 September 1720; Avvisi di Napoli, 1st October 1720; Corriere di Vienna, 5 October 1720; 
Europäische Fama, 1720 p. 847; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 6 September, 19 November 1720; Gazette de Leyde, 6 and 26 
September 1720; Gazzetta di Bologna, 24 September 1720; Leydse courant, 6 September 1720; London Journal, 13 
August 1720; Mercure historique, September 1720 p. 357, November 1720 p. 598; Nouveau Mercure, October 1720 
p. 139; Post Boy, 15 September 1720; Saturday’s Post, 3, 10 September 1720. 
56 Gazette d’Amsterdam, 19 November 1720; Mercure historique, November 1720 p. 598. 
57 ASVA, Secreteria di Stato, Portogallo 75, c. 531; NA, SP 89/28, c. 130, 137, 142, 145; ibid., SP 89/29, c. 
12, 14. Gazette de Leyde, 29 November 1720; La Gazette, 7 September 1720; Lettres historiques, October 1720 p. 
500; Nouveau Mercure, November 1720 p. 181. 
58 Corriere di Vienna, April 1721; Daily Post, 30 August 1720; Gazette de Leyde, 14 January 1721; Gazette 
d’Amsterdam, 14 January 1721; Haerlemsche courant, 21 and 28 September, 22 October, 10 December 1720; 
Lettres historiques, December 1720 p 731, January 1721 p. 111, February 1721 p. 232; Post Boy, 28 March 1721; 
Post Man, 12 November 1720. 
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6.  Mozambique and Monomatapa Company59  
Project (spring 1721). 
Promoted by local entrepreneurs and ministers. 
Mining, long-distance trade (Africa), slave trade. Monopoly rights. 
 
Russia 
1. Banking and Trading Company60 
Project (June 1720). Capital: 20 million rubles (~£4.2 million) with the possibility to increase it. 
Proposed by London-based prince Ščerbatov; discussed in official circles. 
Banking, long-distance trade (China, Persia, Italy, Spain, Portugal), tax farming, fisheries. 
Monopoly rights. Model: John Law’s System. 
 
2. Imperial Trading Company for Persia61 
Project (second half of 1720). 
Projected by the Peter the Great who invited (January 1721) John Law to Russia to direct it. 
Long-distance trade (Persia), mining, manufacturing, colonizing the Caspian area. Monopoly rights. 
 
3. Company for the White Sea fisheries62 
Project (November 1720). 
Unknown projector; discussed among official circles. 
Fisheries. 
 
4. *Oriental Company63 
Project (possibly as early as 1719-1720). Capital: 400,000 rubles (~£84,000). IPO Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg (probably 1721). 
Projected by Russian and foreign merchants, supported by prince Menshikov (close friend of Peter 
the Great, repeatedly involved in corruption scandals). 
Long-distance trade (China and Persia). 
                                                
59 Daily Post, 31 May 1721; Corriere di Vienna, 18 June, 16 August 1721; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 3 June 1721; 
Gazette de Leyde, 5 August 1721; Mercure historique, June 1721 p. 780. 
60 Troickij (1970). 
61 Ibid. 
62 AAE, B I 988, c. 84-85. The French consul in St. Petersburg writes about this scheme. 
63 Daily Courant, 22 February, 24 March 1722; Daily Journal, 27 February 1722; Daily Post, 23 February, 28 
March 1722; Evening Post, 24 February 1722; Lettres historiques, Mars 1722 p. 309. 
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Note: a Russian diplomatic mission went to Beijing in 1719 to negotiate the reopening of free trade 
with China.64 Negotiation failed (late 1721) resulting in the demise of the company. 
 
Sicily 
1. Ostend-based trading Company65 
Project (September 1720). 
Promoted by Ignazio Perlongo (a senior official of the Sicilian government); discussed by the 
imperial government.  
Long-distance trade (America, Asia), intra-European trade, manufacturing. Monopoly rights. 
Note: the company, mostly financed with Sicilian capital, would have been based in Ostend (part of 
the Habsburg empire, like Sicily); from there it would have managed the export of Sicilian goods 
and the import in Sicily of colonial commodities and products from northern Europe. 
 
2. Trieste-based trading Company66 
Project (September 1720). 
Promoted by Ignazio Perlongo (see above); discussed by the imperial government.  
Long-distance trade (Levant, Africa), intra-European trade, manufacturing. Monopoly rights. 
Note: the enterprise, mostly financed with Sicilian capital, would have been based in the free ports 
of Trieste and Fiume (part of the Habsburg empire, like Sicily); from there it would have managed 
the export of Sicilian goods and the import in Sicily of products from the Levant and Africa. 
 
3. Messina Levant Company67 
Project (late 1721). 
Projected by Jewish merchants from Hamburg; support from the emperor, but opposition from 
Sicilian authorities. 
Long-distance trade (Levant), intra-European trade. 
Note: according to Venetian intelligence, other Jewish merchants, in particular from Livorno and 
Genoa, were supposed to participate in the project. 
 
                                                
64 Bell (1788); Sladkovskii (1966). 
65 Gallo, ‘La relazione Sul commercio in Sicilia’, 1995. 
66 Ibid. 
67 ASV, V Savi, Decreti 71, 17 January 1721. 
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Spain 
1. West India Company68 
Project (1718-1719) 
Projected by Giulio Alberoni (Spain’s principal minister). 
Long-distance trade (America), manufacturing. Model: English and Dutch East India Companies. 
Note: the company would have been based in Cadiz. The war of the Quadruple Alliance and 
Alberoni’s subsequent fall and exile prevented him from implementing the project. 
 
2. East India Company69 
Project (1718-1719) 
Projected by Giulio Alberoni (see above). 
Long-distance trade (Pacific and East Asia). 
Note: the company would have been based in Cadiz. The war of the Quadruple Alliance and 
Alberoni’s subsequent fall and exile prevented him from implementing the project. 
 
3. South Sea and Philippines Company70 
Project (spring 1720).  
Projected by entrepreneurs from Vigo, Bilbao, and Cadiz, together with English, Dutch, and Jewish 
investors; rejected by the crown. 
Long-distance trade (America, Pacific, Asia). Monopoly rights. 
 
4. Trading Company71 
Project (March 1720).  
Proposed by Rudolfo Zaf (possibly a Swiss projector). 
Long-distance trade (America), intra-European trade.  
 
5. Trade and Asiento Company72 
Project (April 1720). 
Proposed by abbot Giovan Battista Bielato (Spain’s agent in Genoa). 
Long-distance trade (America, Africa, Asia), intra-European trade, slave trade.  
                                                
68 Lettre d’un prélat (pub. in Gazette d’Amsterdam, 13 March 1722); Bignami (1833), p. 55; Bersani (1861), p. 168. 
69 Ibid. 
70 AHNM, Estado leg. 3188, n. 417 (s.d. but very likely the same project than the one mentioned in the 
press); Corriere di Vienna, 2 October 1720; Daily Post, 11 May, 27 June 1720; Gazzetta di Bologna, 18 June 1720.  
71 AGS, Estado leg. 7842, 17 March 1720. Although Zaf’s letter does not explicitly mention the creation of a 
joint-stock company, there is a strong presumption that he had that in mind. 
72 AGS, Estado leg. 7843, 16 April 1720. 
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Note: the firm would have been based in Madrid. Bielato’s idea was to form a company in order to 
increase Spanish trade with the rest of Europe and with its colonies, but without any monopoly 
besides slave trade to America (asiento). 
 
6. Cadiz Company for the exclusive trade to Spanish America, the exclusive Spanish wool & iron 
trade, and for the Mediterranean and North Sea trade73 
Project (June 1720). Capital: 50 million P. (~£10.7 million). 
Proposed by Louis le Maingre de Bouciquault (Spanish agent in Holland) on behalf of a group of 
Dutch investors; rejected by the crown. 
Long-distance trade (America), intra-European trade, manufacturing, mining. Monopoly rights.  
 
7.  General Trading Company of Spain74 
Project (July 1720). 
Proposed by a different group of Dutch investors; rejected by the crown. 
Long-distance trade (America) and possibly other destinations (Asia, Europe). Monopoly rights. 
Note: the Dutch investors submitted their scheme directly to the Spanish ambassador in the United 
Provinces. 
 
8. West and East India Company75 
Project (July 1720). 
Promoted by Antonio Sartine (a French financier in the service of the king of Spain)76 together with 
Swiss and other foreign and Spanish investors; rejected by the crown. 
Long-distance trade (America, Asia) and possibly also banking. Monopoly rights. 
 
                                                
73 AGS, Estado leg. 6192, 15 June, 12 August 1720; NA, SP 94/89, 22 and 29 July 1720. Amsterdamse courant, 
24 August 1720; Corriere di Vienna, 31 July, 2 October 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 12 and 16 July, 18 October 
1720; Gazette de Leyde, 12 July 1720; Flying Post, 30 August 1720; Post Boy, 9 July 1720.  
74 AGS, Estado leg. 6192, 25 July and 12 August 1720; NA, SP 94/89, 22 and 29 July. Corriere di Vienna, 
2 October 1720; Flying Post, 30 August 1720.  
75 NA, SP 94/89, 22 July: the British ambassador in Madrid reports that ‘several plans’ have been offered to 
the king of Spain for ‘erecting trading companies’ that would have a monopoly on trade with Spanish 
America. The term ‘several’ implies that there were more than two, but probably not many more. I opt 
therefore for a conservative hypothesis of three plans. The ambassador describes in detail only one of these 
projects (n. 6 here). The scheme mentioned by the Spanish ambassador in The Hague (AGS, Estado leg. 
6192) corresponds to projects n. 7. The third project (n. 8) would correspond to the scheme mentioned in an 
anonymous report written by a spy in the service of Britain: NA, SP 101/121, s.d. It possibly also corresponds 
to the banking scheme reported in the Gazzetta di Bologna, 23 July 1720 (both the report and the Gazzetta 
mention the role of Swiss investors). 
76 On Sartine, see Torres Sánchez (2015), p. 42. 
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9. Spanish wool Company77 
Project (October 1720). 
Promoted by French investors; rejected by the crown. 
Intra-European and long-distance trade. Monopoly rights. 
 
10. Bank and Spanish America Trading Company (first project)78 
Project (October 1720). Capital: 400 million P. (~£86 million). 
Promoted by a syndicate of French investors; rejected by the crown. 
Long-distance trade (America), intra-European trade, banking. Monopoly rights. 
Note: the company would have paid 30 million P. to the crown in exchange for the charter. 
 
11. Bank and Spanish America Trading Company (second project)79 
Project (October 1720).  
Promoted by another syndicate of French investors; rejected by the crown. 
Long-distance trade (America), intra-European trade, banking. Monopoly rights. 
 
12. West & East India, and Levant Company80 
Project (second half of 1720). Capital: 50 million P. (~£10.7 million). 
Unknown projector, possibly Louis le Maingre de Bouciquault (see above). 
Long-distance trade (America, Asia, Levant), slave trade, tax farming, manufacturing, fisheries. 
Monopoly rights. Debt-for-equity swap. Model: John Law system. 
Note: the company would have paid 4 million P. per year to the crown (~£0.85 million). 
 
13. Trading Company81 
Project (summer 1721). Capital: 24-30 million P. (~£6.4-5.1 million). 
Proposed by a Dutch projector; discussed among official circles. 
Long-distance trade (America and possibly other Spanish dominions), intra-European trade. 
 
                                                
77 NA, SP 94/90, 21 October 1720. 
78 NA, SP 94/90, 7 and 28 October 1720. See also Mercurii relation, 9 November 1720. 
79 NA, SP 94/90, 7 October 1720. 
80 AHNM, Estado leg. 3188, n. 415 (s.d. but clearly 1720). The style of the text, together with several other 
clues, suggest that Bouciquault was the author of this scheme. 
81 Corriere di Vienna, 27 August 1721; Gazeta de Lisboa, 23 October 1721; Gazzetta di Bologna, 19 August 1721. 
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Sweden 
1. Madagascar Company82 
Project (1718?-1721). 
Promoted by William Morgan together with other associates; supported by the crown. 
Long-distance trade (Africa and Asia). 
 
2. China Company83 
Project (1721). 
Unknown projector; possibly supported by the crown, certainly discussed among official circles.  
Long-distance trade (Asia). 
 
Switzerland 
1. Bern Trading Company84 
Project (March 1720). 
Promoted by a projector from the Grisons (an independent confederation allied to Switzerland); 
rejected by the government. 
Intra-European trade. Monopoly rights. 
 
2. General Trading Company85  
Project (March 1721). 
Unknown projector; discussed among official circles. 
Manufacturing, intra-European trade. 
 
                                                
82 Riksarkivet (Stockholm), Miscellanea 757, 16, c, 1, 192a, 20 May 1720 and 7 June 1721; ibid., 192b, 12 
May 1723. I am grateful to Daniel Menning for advising me to consult these two folders, and providing me 
with the exact references. 
83 Riksarkivet (Stockholm), Miscellanea 757, 16, c, 1, 192a, 7 June 1721.  
84 Gazette d’Amsterdam, 28 May, 18 and 25 June, 9 August 1720; Gazeta de Lisboa, 12 September 1720; 
Haerlemsche courant, 30 May, 27 June, 10 August 1720.  
85 Amsterdamsche Argus, 2 April 1721 (n. 43); Daily Courant, 7 March 1721; Daily Journal, 7 March, 30 May 
1721; Lettres historiques, April 1721 p. 411, June 1721 p. 622; Mercure historique, June 1721 p. 734.  
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Tuscany 
1. Company86 
Project (May 1720). 
Promoted by Antonio Prandone, a Sicilian projector arrived in Livorno from London. 
Note: we don’t know what should have been the firm’s business, but we know that it was supposed 
to increase the state’s wealth. 
 
Venice 
1. Levant Company87 
Project (November 1719-February 1720). 
Promoted by Venetian businessmen with the support of the government. 
Long-distance trade (Levant). 
Note: the project envisaged inviting foreign investors, and in particular foreign companies, to buy 
shares. 
 
2. *Trade Company©88 
Project (February 1719), charter (July 1719), IPO in Venice oversubscribed (September 1720). 
Capital: 480,000 ducat (~£187,000). 
Projected by a group of Venetian entrepreneurs, actively supported by the government. 
Manufacturing and intra-European trade. 
Note: the firm started operations on a small scale in 1719. Due to strong opposition from local 
guilds, it did not manage to significantly increase its production. Yet, the company survived at least 
until 1735.89 
                                                
86 Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Mediceo del principato, Lettere di particolari 1140, c. 317. We don’t have 
the details of the scheme, yet it is highly probable that it included the creation of a joint-stock company. 
87 AAE, CP Milan 23, c. 50. Journal historique, January 1720 p. 49; La Gazette, 25 November and 2 December 
1719; Mercure historique, December 1719 p. 614. 
88 ASV, V Savi, scritture dep. com. 213, c. 27-32, 146, 196; ASV, V Savi, decreti 71, 24 January 1721 
[1722], 18 April 1722; AST, Finanza, I a., Lotteria, etc., m. 1; AST, Materie di commercio 3, m. 1, n. 36; 
Biblioteca Casanatense, Msc. 2234,4. ‘Relazione della Compagnia di Nuova Istituzione’. Amsterdamsche Argus, , 
October 1720 p. 134 (n. 17); Applebee Journal, 10 September 1720; Daily Courant, 15 September 1720; Corriere di 
Vienna, 11 December 1720; Daily Post, 8 October 1720; Gazeta de Lisboa, 7 November 1720; Gazette d’Amsterdam, 
13 September 1720; Gazette de Leyde, 13 September 1720; Gazzetta di Bologna, 3 September 1720; La Gazette, 21 
September, 5 and 12 October 1720; Lettres historiques, October 1720 p. 407; Mercure historique, September 1720 
p. 262; Post Boy, 6 October 1720. Caizzi (1965) p. 46. 
89 A Livorno-based Jewish partnership offered its services to the firm in 1735: Trivellato (2009), p. 206. 
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Appendix II. Schemes not taken into account in the survey because the 
archival evidence is not solid enough (see supra) 
 
Austria 
Debt-for-equity schemes1  
Project (May 1720). 
According to an English newspaper, the emperor had rejected several schemes for ‘discharging the 
publick debts’. 
Note: the information is plausible (see supra), yet I could not find any other source mentioning it. 
 
France 
Bank2 
Project (early 1721) 
Note: there is not enough evidence that this enterprise would have been a joint-stock. 
 
Portugal 
Insurance firm3  
Project (December 1720). 
Note: I could not find any other source mentioning this project. 
 
Sweden 
Insurance firm4 
Project (1720). 
Note: Amsinck mention this scheme without giving a reference. Daniel Menning and I 
enquired in the Swedish archives, but we did not find any evidence about it. 
 
Venice 
Insurance firm5  
Project (August 1720). 
Note: I could not find any other source mentioning this project. 
                                                
1 Weekly Packet, 4 June 1720. 
2 Bergasse and Rambert (1954), IV, p. 487. 
3 Gazette de Leyde, 14 January 1721 (supplement). 
4 Amsinck (1894), p. 477. 
5 Gazette de Leyde, 13 September 1720. 
